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 ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation we collate a unique hand-collected dataset of 417 IPO firms for the 
2001 to 2004 period, and study the effectiveness of governance and signaling 
mechanisms at an IPO. In chapter 1 our main contention is that current management 
research on IPOs has primarily looked at how corporate governance variables like board 
composition and ownership structure affect IPO underpricing, while largely overlooking 
the implications of these governance structures for long-term liquidity. This is a 
significant oversight, given the many benefits to IPO issuers from having a liquid stock 
(e.g., reduced cost of capital, increased external monitoring etc.). We find that both pre-
IPO ownership structures and the degree of underpricing affect aftermarket liquidity. 
More specifically, the information advantages of large ownership reduce stock liquidity, 
while increased liquidity following greater underpricing underlines a key benefit of 
underpricing that has been previously ignored. We are therefore able to present a fuller 
picture of pre-IPO ownership and underpricing and their long term performance 
implications. In chapter 2 we look at how signaling at the time of IPO certifies firm 
quality and helps address the adverse selection problem for uninformed investors. We 
contend that classifying signals according to common characteristics (like cost) has 
significant managerial implications in terms of whether, when and how much firms need 
to invest in developing signals, and how these decisions are likely to influence 
subsequent firm performance. We then contribute to the literature by proposing a 
typology of signals based on whether signaling costs are incurred upfront (default-
independent) or whether they depend on future profitability (default-contingent). We 
argue that this definitional distinction highlights more fundamental differences in the 
underlying characteristics of the two signal types in terms of cost, clarity, consistency, 
commitment and visibility. Only default-independent signals usually possess these 
desirable characteristics, making them more powerful determinants of firm value than 
default-contingent signals.    
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, UNDERPRICING, AND STOCK LIQUIDITY IN 
IPO FIRMS 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.1. The IPO underpricing context. 
The initial public offering (IPO) context has proved very fruitful to management scholars 
keen on studying the complexities managers face in making a firm public. Such 
complexities arise from the multiplicity of actors (like venture capitalists, underwriters, 
IPO firm’s board of directors, investors etc.) with differing perspectives and goals, as 
well as from the information asymmetry and uncertainty that inevitably accompany any 
new issue. For example, the board may wish to retain control post-IPO and to leave as 
little money on the table as possible, the venture capitalist may want to cash out of the 
venture as quickly as possible, the underwriter may want to minimize its risks, and the 
retail investor may try her best to avoid a lemons problem. Given these conflicting 
priorities and the liability of newness, one of the most crucial decisions IPO firm 
managers make concerns underpricing, or the deliberate decision to set an offer price 
which is lower than the expected closing price of the issue after the first day’s trading. A 
vast literature in finance has examined this first-day underpricing of IPOs (for review, see 
Ritter and Welch, 2002). The IPO underpricing phenomenon also finds increased 
mention in the management literature (e.g., Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, and Johnson, 
2008; Certo, Covin, Daily, Cannella and Dalton, 2003; Higgins and Gulati, 2005). In 
particular, management research has looked at how corporate governance mechanisms 
like ownership and board structures, founder status and compensation contracts affect the 
pricing of new offerings. Here we first contend that the underpricing decision, because of 
this complexity, presents the IPO manager with a rather intractable problem. Next, we 
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introduce long-term stock liquidity, and empirically test its relationship with both 
underpricing and the pre-IPO board ownership structure. In doing so, we seek to provide 
a clearer picture to the IPO manager of the long-term implications of managerial 
decisions made on the eve of the IPO. We believe that by looking at the underpricing 
problem in its totality, the IPO firm manager will be able to take better and impartial 
decisions when faced with the conflicting demands of various interest groups. 
 
1.1.2. The advantages of stock liquidity. 
It is important in this context to understand the importance of stock liquidity. Ensuring 
high stock liquidity is often considered one of the most important objectives of any IPO 
(e.g., Pham, Kalev and Steen, 2003). Liquidity is the ease of trading a security (Amihud, 
Mendelson and Pedersen, 2005). The liquidity of stock trading plays a very important 
role in empirical asset pricing, market efficiency and corporate finance (Goyenko, 
Holden, Lundblad and Trzcinka, 2009). Higher trading liquidity reduces the transactions 
costs of future equity issues (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995), decreases required returns and 
increases firm value (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986), and also enables effective market 
monitoring and stronger managerial incentives by incorporating greater information in 
stock prices (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Liquid secondary markets also facilitate 
acquisitions for IPO firms, and allow the pre-IPO owners to enhance the value of their 
equity holdings (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). A lack of liquidity (“illiquidity”), on the other 
hand, implies that transactions costs - comprising price impact costs (the price concession 
that a buyer or a seller of security makes when trading, which is the same as the bid-ask 
spread for small orders), search and delay costs (when a trader looks for a price better 
4 
 
than that quoted on the market) and direct trading costs (exchange fees, taxes and 
brokerage)go up. This leads to the absence of continuous trading due to an imbalance in 
the number of buyers and sellers in the capital markets at a given time (Demsetz, 1968), 
not allowing pre-IPO owners to cash out of the business when necessary.  
 
1.1.3. Stock liquidity as a dependent variable.  
In spite of the importance of liquidity in decreasing the cost of capital and increasing the 
firm’s net present value, and the fact that stock liquidity can, at least be in part, be 
determined by the actions of the manager (as we show in this paper), little research in 
management has looked at stock liquidity as a dependent variable. One important 
exception is Levitas & McFadyen (2009), who look at how the signaling and cash flow 
properties of patents and alliance forms affect a firm’s need for liquid asset holdings. 
Their outcome variable is internal liquidity, defined as a firm’s cash and marketable 
securities divided by the book value of its total assets. Another paper by Schnatterly, 
Shaw & Jennings (2008) looks at how the percentage of shares owned by the largest 
institutional owner increases the bid-ask spread in share prices (which acts as a proxy for 
the perceived information risk of the market-maker). In the finance literature, on the other 
hand, the bid-ask spread has more often been used as a proxy for a firm’s liquidity – the 
higher the spread, the lower the liquidity. Here we look at the external rather than the 
internal liquidity of a firm’s stock, explain movements in stock liquidity by looking at the 
bid-ask spread, and directly measure liquidity using commonly employed proxies like the 
Amihud measure. Notwithstanding the very different worldviews of financial economics 
and strategic management research (Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin, 1999), early studies 
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have argued in favor of integrating the financial paradigm into strategic management 
research (e.g. Sandberg, Lewellen and Stanley, 1987). Indeed, as Kochhar (Pg. 714, 
1996) mention, “a common viewpoint held by all is that financial decisions are important 
from a strategic perspective, and should be included in the domain of strategic 
management research”. Here we follow this tradition, and add to the strategic 
management literature by integrating concepts from finance and management. 
 
1.1.4. Liquidity and external governance. 
Our study also adds to the corporate governance literature. Most governance research in 
the IPO context has looked at internal governance mechanisms like board structure, stock 
options, ownership etc. Yet, as Dharwadkar, George & Brandes (Pg. 652, 2000) point 
out, “strong external control mechanisms are associated with the Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance, where shareholders are comparatively passive with respect to 
internal control mechanisms”. These external governance mechanisms include hostile 
takeovers, proxy contests, leveraged buy-outs and the legal protection of minority 
shareholder rights (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Also, the effectiveness of these external or 
market-based governance mechanisms depends in large measure on the liquidity of 
secondary equity markets (Tadesse, 2005). Liquidity promotes price discovery i.e. stock 
prices more accurately reflect the firm’s true state of affairs (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993), enables the more active investors to build large positions and thereby put pressure 
on firm management for better firm governance (Maug, 1998), and facilitates the market 
for corporate control by allowing bidders to raise large amounts of capital at short notice 
(Tadesse, 2005). Therefore, by looking at the role of stock liquidity as an indirect proxy 
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for external corporate governance, this paper also examines the implications of the 
underpricing decision for long-term firm monitoring and control.  
 
1.1.5. IPO underpricing – causes and implications. 
Lastly, we add to the IPO literature on underpricing. This literature takes several 
theoretical approaches, which can broadly be classified as asymmetric information 
approaches, institutional approaches, and ownership and control approaches (Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist, 2001 – see Appendix A). The asymmetric information approach includes 
underpricing models based on adverse selection or the winner’s curse (Rock, 1986), 
signaling (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Ibbotson, 1975), principal-agent relations (Baron, 
1982) and information revelation (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). Institutional 
underpricing models include the legal insurance hypothesis (Hughes and Thakor, 1992) 
and the price support hypothesis (Ruud, 1991). Ownership and control theories view 
underpricing as a means to retain managers’ private benefits of control (Brennan and 
Franks, 1997) or to cut down on agency costs (Stoughton and Zechner, 1998). However, 
most of this research on IPOs has focused on explaining the causes of first-day 
underpricing, while very little research has looked at the implications of underpricing for 
stock liquidity. Similarly, while the impact of the board’s ownership structure on 
underpricing has been examined (e.g., Arthurs et al., 2008), no study has been done on 
the impact of these corporate governance variables on the long-term liquidity of the IPO 
firm. In this paper, we introduce aftermarket or secondary market liquidity (defined here 
as liquidity a year after the date of the IPO) as the missing link in the IPO underpricing 
puzzle, and thereby seek to present a more complete picture of this phenomenon. Our 
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findings confirm that underpricing at the time of the IPO reduces long-term stock 
liquidity. We also find that the presence (at the pre-IPO stage) of outside directors with 
equity reduces long-term liquidity both directly (as we explain later) and indirectly (by 
reducing underpricing).  
 
1.2. THEORY  
 
1.2.1. Formal underpricing theories. 
Two primary concerns relating to IPOs have come to the fore – the initial underpricing of 
IPO offerings and the long-term underperformance of IPOs (Gompers and Lerner, 2003; 
Ritter, 1991). Several theoretical perspectives have been advanced to explain these 
phenomena. Life-cycle theories, for example, indicate that firms go public when they 
reach a certain stage of their life-cycle (Zingales, 1995), while market-timing theories 
suggest that IPOs are issued when the market is strong. In both cases, the persistence of 
first-day underpricing cannot be explained merely in terms of compensating the risk-
averse investor for transactions costs (bid-ask spread) in the market. Starting with 
Ibbotson (1975), more formal theories (which we briefly mentioned in the introduction) 
have emerged to explain this apparent anomaly. In this paper we borrow ideas from two 
of these theories, the information asymmetry perspective and the ownership and control 
perspective, to develop a holistic model of IPO underpricing. 
 
1.2.2. Information asymmetry. 
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Our first theoretical lens is the asymmetric information perspective which states that there 
is an ex-ante uncertainty associated with IPOs arising out of factors like company age, 
offering characteristics, disclosure in the prospectus, underwriter reputation etc. (Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986). Information asymmetry is high in young, growth firms (Barabanov and 
McNamara, 2002). The problem is accentuated when market makers have to deal with 
informed traders (like inside directors with equity). Uninformed investors fear the 
winner’s curse - receiving the full quota of unattractive offerings while facing 
competition from informed investors for the attractive offerings (Rock, 1986). 
1
 We base 
our hypotheses on a common proxy for liquidity, namely price impact (for standardized 
transactions the price impact is the bid-ask spread). We aver that liquidity is sticky, and 
therefore the influence of ownership structure and underpricing on premarket liquidity 
(i.e. liquidity in the market immediately following the IPO) is carried over to the 
aftermarket. Besides, information asymmetry is present not only in the premarket, but 
also in the aftermarket (Chen and Wilhelm, 2005). 
2
 This information asymmetry in the 
aftermarket further reduces stock liquidity as market makers react to increased trading  
costs by increasing bid-ask spreads and reducing quoted depths (Heflin and Shaw, 2000). 
We primarily use the asymmetric information perspective (though we also combine it 
                                                          
1
 Another strand within the asymmetric information approach assumes that underpricing is done in order to 
signal firm quality, so that potential investors are convinced of the real high value of the firm (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989;   Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). 
2
 The uncertainty in the IPO aftermarket also depends, among other things, on how much information was 
disclosed at the IPO stage, which in turn depends on the IPO method used (bookbuilding, for example, 
elicits greater information than the fixed-price  method). 
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with the trading or free-float hypothesis, as explained later) to understand the causes of 
illiquidity.  
 
1.2.3. Ownership and control. 
Our second theoretical lens is the ownership and control perspective (Brennan and 
Franks, 1997; Stoughton and Zechner, 1998). We contend that the impact of ownership 
structure and underpricing on post-IPO liquidity has long-term implications for market 
monitoring (i.e. by outside blockholders post-IPO) and control (i.e. of pre-IPO owners). 
However, current findings are conflicting in this regard. First, the ownership structure-
liquidity relation predicts a trade-off between internal monitoring and control (by pre-IPO 
insiders owning equity) and liquidity (which ensures external monitoring by institutional 
investors). Concentrated ownership by pre-IPO owners resolves an immediate agency 
problem (by reducing underpricing), but it also reduces stock liquidity, which in turn 
hinders long-term market monitoring by outside blockholders (by incorporating lesser 
information in stock prices - Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) and enables pre-IPO large 
owners to retain their private benefits of control. This view is supported by Maug (1998) 
who contends that liquidity enables market monitoring, as institutional investors can buy 
large blocks of shares which give them both the ability and the incentive to monitor. 
Second is the underpricing-liquidity perspective. Underpricing creates a dispersed 
ownership structure (via oversubscription and rationing) which promotes secondary 
market liquidity. However, ownership dispersion creates a free-rider problem and 
minimizes the possibility that outsiders will monitor firm management (Brennan and 
Franks, 1997). This view finds support from Bhide (1994) who states that liquidity 
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promotes arm’s length shareholding, and large investors prefer exit to voice. To sum, 
there is some consensus in the literature that ownership concentration reduces liquidity 
while underpricing increases liquidity; however, there is no consensus on whether 
liquidity promotes or hinders market monitoring. In other words, the ownership-
monitoring-control theoretical lens well explains what causes illiquidity, but offers mixed 
results regarding its implications for monitoring (by outside blockholders like 
institutions) and retention of control (by pre-IPO large owners like directors). However, 
we still contend that ensuring long-term liquidity is a desirable objective for IPO issuers, 
given the many other benefits of liquidity we discussed earlier.  
 
1.3. HYPOTHESES 
 
1.3.1. Inside directors and underpricing. 
The directors of an IPO firm want to reduce underpricing, as not doing so results in 
money left on the table both for themselves (depending on the number of shares they sell 
during the IPO) and for the firm (Arthurs et al., 2008). This motivation to retain wealth 
further increases when directors own equity stakes in the firm. Equity ownership by 
directors creates a psychological attachment to the organization, aligning owner interests 
with the interests of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, greater equity 
ownership leads to lesser value-reducing diversification (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997). 
Greater equity ownership also confers greater legitimacy upon the board, which enables 
firms to influence investor perceptions and raise the required capital (Higgins and Gulati, 
2005), since investors are willing to pay more for IPO shares that are backed by the 
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equity commitment of board members. Inside directors also have expert firm-specific 
knowledge, and are likely to be more innovative and insightful in directing firm strategy. 
Certo, Covin, Daily and Dalton (2001) discuss the key role inside directors play in 
reducing underpricing in the specific context of the founder-managed firm, arguing that 
investment banks do not apply the founder bias discount (which increases underpricing) 
to insider-dominated boards.  
 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) similarly point out that insiders have a better 
understanding of environmental uncertainty and the intrinsic worth of the firm, and are 
therefore in a position to correctly judge the true value of the newly-floated enterprise. 
Inside directors also possess valuable tacit knowledge regarding the IPO venture, and 
therefore have both the ability (due to knowledge) and the incentive (due to ownership) to 
monitor (Kroll, Walters and Le, 2007). However, if we accept Baron’s (1982) contention 
that the issuer is less informed than the underwriter, the issuer’s discretion in 
underpricing might be curtailed by underwriters keen to increase underpricing in order to 
allocate those underpriced shares to their favored buy-side clients (Loughran and Ritter, 
2002; Ritter and Welch, 2002). But when insider ownership is concentrated, insiders have 
lesser information asymmetry versus underwriters, which increases their relative 
influence (Chiang and Venkatesh, 1988). Also, firms with greater insider ownership are 
less risky (Beatty and Zajac, 1994), and therefore can command higher premiums from 
potential investors.  
 
1.3.2. Outside directors and underpricing.  
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Turning to outside directors, we find that one of their key roles, viz. resource-acquisition, 
is primarily done by the venture capitalist and the investment bank at the time of the IPO. 
Likewise, their role as agents of shareholders is less direct and clear-cut at the time of the 
IPO, and therefore they may not play a traditional monitoring role (Certo et al., 2001). 
However, outside directors with equity stakes not only have a financial incentive, but also 
tend to identify with the IPO firm, making them more vigilant in their oversight 
(Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). Outside directors also have their reputations to protect, 
and therefore have little incentive to collude with other self-serving agents (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). As with inside directors, outside director presence acts as a strong signal 
of firm quality, adding more credibility to the IPO firm (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2004, 
for example, argue that external parties like creditors place greater reliance on financial 
statements of firms with a majority of independent directors), and giving firm 
management greater bargaining power in its dealings with underwriters and venture 
capitalists. Outsiders’ experience and connections also add greater diversity to the board, 
and makes up for any lack of experience and contacts of the inside directors of a young 
and growing IPO firm (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). In sum, outside directors with 
equity stakes play a strategic role in reducing underpricing in an IPO firm.  
 
Hypothesis 1a) Greater board insider proportion reduces IPO underpricing 
Hypothesis 1b) Greater ownership by board insiders reduces IPO underpricing 
Hypothesis 1c) Greater ownership by board outsiders reduces IPO underpricing 
 
1.3.3. Underpricing and liquidity. 
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One of the key objectives of any IPO is to ensure greater secondary market liquidity 
(Pham et al., 2003). IPO underpricing is a widely used mechanism to achieve higher 
aftermarket liquidity. Underpricing can bring about higher liquidity in two ways. First, 
underpricing acts as an incentive to attract uninformed investors who might otherwise 
fear the ‘winner’s curse’ and stay away (Rock, 1986). Second, underpricing ensures over-
subscription of shares (Brennan and Franks, 1997). This way, current owners can 
discriminate against large applicants in the allocation process, protecting themselves 
against possible hostile takeover attempts, and ensuring a dispersed ownership pattern. 
Greater breadth and diffusion lead to active post-IPO trading and increased liquidity 
(Booth and Chua, 1996). Besides, liquidity in the secondary market is a path-dependent 
process so that higher initial liquidity attracts more investors, resulting in a persistently 
high level of liquidity even in the aftermarket (Carvalho and Tolentino, 2009).   
 
Similarly, Reese (1998) finds that underpriced IPOs have significantly higher trading 
volume (and hence liquidity) not only during the first week of trading, but for more than 
three years after the IPO issue date. Here underpricing is used to incentivize potential 
investors to honestly reveal their interest in the offering (as in Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989) so that greater investor interest leads to higher initial returns (in the premarket) and 
higher trading volumes (in the premarket as well as in the secondary market). Therefore, 
investor interest explains both the positive relation between underpricing and aftermarket 
liquidity, as well as its persistence. Zheng, Ogden and Jen (2005) find that underpricing 
reduces an investor’s reservation bid-ask spread, somewhat offsetting the severe 
problems of information asymmetry and heterogeneous expectations that accompany an 
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IPO issue. In the short run, both high and low value investors will be attracted, while in 
the long run, investors who have already researched the stock will continue to closely 
monitor it, since they have already made an information investment. Rajan and Servaes 
(1997) similarly contend that underpriced IPOs have greater analyst following, so that 
more investors hear of the stock, and it forms ‘part of the subset of tradable securities for 
a greater number of investors’ (Reese, 1998, pg. 8).  
 
Miller and Reilly (1987), in their study of 510 IPO issues in 1982 and 1983, also find a 
positive relation between initial returns (higher underpricing) and trading volume (higher 
liquidity), as do Schultz and Zaman (1994) and Boehmer and Fishe (2001). Miller and 
Reilly’s contention though is that investor uncertainty (rather than investor interest) 
drives both greater underpricing and greater trading volume. Boehmer and Fishe (2001), 
on the other hand, look at underpricing not as a compensation to buy stock which does 
not have a perfect substitute in the secondary market, but rather as an allocation 
mechanism to attract low-valuation investors who act as flippers in the secondary market, 
thereby ensuring aftermarket liquidity. Underpricing can also indirectly facilitate 
liquidity. For example, underwriters initially go short on a few stocks to ensure price 
stabilization in the premarket. In the aftermarket, they cover their short position through 
the purchase of stocks at the issue price, purchase of stocks at the market price, or a 
combination of both (Carvalho and Tolentino, 2009). These activities, which enhance 
liquidity both in the premarket and the aftermarket, should be profitable for the 
underwriter only when she can buy back the stocks at the (underpriced) offer price or at 
an even lower market price. Underpricing therefore enables the underwriter to act as a 
15 
 
market maker and as an active provider of liquidity. Finally, the positive relation between 
underpricing and liquidity is robust. For example, Hahn and Ligon (2006) find that the 
underpricing – liquidity relation holds for seven out of ten different measures of liquidity 
(based on transaction costs, turnover, volume etc.), both before and after the lock-up 
period, and after conducting a multivariate analysis with twenty different control 
variables (like trade size, number of trades, market capitalization etc.) that have been 
found in the literature to affect liquidity. 
 
Hypothesis 2) IPO underpricing increases aftermarket liquidity 
 
1.3.4. Director ownership and liquidity. 
Most empirical studies reveal that while large shareholders reduce agency costs by acting 
as effective monitors (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), they also reduce stock liquidity 
(e.g., Heflin and Shaw, 2000). The negative relation between ownership concentration 
and market liquidity has been widely documented in the finance literature (Bolton and 
Thadden, 1998; Chiang and Venkatesh, 1988; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1993). Bolton and Thadden (1998), for example, aver that a reduction in market 
capitalization is the principal mechanism by which concentrated ownership reduces 
liquidity. Similarly, Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (2000) find that higher fractional 
ownership by both insiders and institutional investors increases effective spread and 
reduces quoted depth (thereby reducing liquidity), even after controlling for any potential 
endogeneity between ownership and liquidity. Both insiders and institutional investors 
can own blocks of shares during or immediately after an IPO. Here we focus on the 
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impact of insider ownership, partly because it fits in with the rest of our hypotheses, but 
also because (a) in an IPO, undiversified inside blockholders (e.g., board members) are 
more likely to possess value-relevant private information than diversified outside 
blockholders like institutional investors (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) and (b) insider 
ownership during IPOs is typically much higher than for publicly traded firms (Corwin, 
Harris and Lipson, 2004).  
 
There are two main mechanisms through which insider block ownership can influence the 
IPO firm’s aftermarket liquidity, namely, changing the firm’s information environment or 
changing its trading activity level (e.g., Brockman and Chung, 2009). The adverse 
selection hypothesis is based on information asymmetry models in the market 
microstructure literature in which blockholders possess private information, and market 
makers react to the possibility of loss in dealing with informed traders by increasing bid-
ask spreads (more specifically, the adverse selection component of the spread) and 
lowering quoted depths, thereby reducing stock liquidity (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; 
Kyle, 1985). Also, while both inside and outside directors can be ‘blockholding insiders’ 
whose presence reduces liquidity, inside directors will likely possess more private 
information than outside directors with equity (just as both groups possess more 
information than institutional investors), hence the effect will be greater for greater inside 
directors’ proportion. This so-called ‘information friction’ effect (Stoll, 2000) aptly 
applies to IPO firms, which are mostly young and have intangible growth prospects. 
Under the trading or free-float hypothesis, on the other hand, insider block ownership 
reduces the IPO firm’s trading activity (in terms of the number of trades rather than the 
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trade size) relative to a diffusely-owned firm. This is the ‘real friction’ effect (Stoll, 
2000), wherein the fixed costs component of the spread (comprising order processing and 
inventory holding costs) goes up as real fixed costs are spread over fewer trades, thereby 
reducing liquidity (Brockman and Chung, 2009). 
3
 
 
Pham et al. (2003) look upon ownership structure as a moderator between underpricing 
and liquidity. They find that underpricing is positively related to the breadth and equality 
of the ownership structure formed after the allocation process, and a dispersed ownership 
structure in turn improves secondary market liquidity (and vice-versa). These results are 
robust to different specifications of the ownership structure and to different measures of 
liquidity (trading turnover and bid-ask spread measures). They also argue that monitoring 
by concentrated owners comes at the cost of liquidity, and the IPO firm decides on its 
level of underpricing depending on the marginal gains it derives from the resulting 
ownership structure and liquidity.  
 
Hypothesis 3a) Greater board insider proportion reduces aftermarket liquidity 
Hypothesis 3b) Greater ownership by board insiders reduces aftermarket liquidity 
                                                          
3
 There is also an opposite view which relies on Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling theory to argue that 
reduction in trading activity is only one of two possible consequences of high insider ownership. Share 
retention by pre-IPO owners (both during and after the lock-up period) might actually act as a positive 
signal to attract more trades, thereby increasing liquidity (Li, Zheng and Melancon, 2005). We ignore this 
line of argument given the preponderance of evidence in favor of the real friction hypotheses (e.g., 
Brockman and Chung, 2009; Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007; Rubin, 2007). 
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Hypothesis 3c) Greater ownership by board outsiders reduces aftermarket liquidity 
 
1.4 METHODS 
 
1.4.1. Sample 
We collected data from the prospectuses filed by all firms that undertook IPOs in the U.S. 
market between 2001 and 2004, for a total of 493 firms, which provided the issue and 
first-day prices. We also collected data about insider ratios; equity ownership by inside 
directors, outside directors, and venture capital firms; stock option grants; annual salaries; 
insiders’ age, tenure, presence on other boards, and start-up experience; presence of the 
founder on the board; and dilution and risk factors. For data about daily stock returns and 
the daily dollar trading volume, we turned to CRSP and computed the Amihud measure 
of stock liquidity (see Appendix B). We assessed annual liquidity as the average of daily 
stock returns to trading volume for all trading days between the date of the IPO and one, 
two, and three years. Seventy-six firms in our sample had missing data, which yielded a 
final sample of 417 firms, which is consistent with recent management research in the 
context of IPOs. For example, Arthurs et al. (2008) have a sample size of 307, Bruton et 
al. (2010) have 224, Certo et al. (2001) have 368 and Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) have 
251. 
 
In spite of 9/11 and the dot com bubble in and around the 2001 period, and the resultant 
decline in IPO activity in the immediate post-2001 period, we contend that our sample is 
fairly generalizable and representative of a typical IPO year, for several reasons. While it 
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is true that the number of IPO issues during 2001 – 2003 (not 2004, which had 213 issues 
included in our sample of 417) was significantly lower compared to the ten years or so 
preceding 2001 (and somewhat lower than in the post-2004 period), the characteristics of 
individual IPO issues were not much different. For example, the mean first day return for 
our IPO sample (2001 – 2004) is 12 percent, comparable to the mean return of 11 percent 
for the five-year period from 1990 – 1994 (the period used in Arthurs et al., 2008) and 
expectedly not in line with the bubble period (1999 – 2000) return of 64 percent.  
 
For 3-year buy and hold returns too, our sample (with an average buy-and-hold return of 
43 percent) is comparable to periods like 1990 – 1994 (with an average of 46 percent) but 
not to the bubble period of 1999 – 2000 (average loss of 53 percent). Our sample 
composition is also fairly representative of the larger population of US IPOs. For 
example, technology IPOs constitute 36 percent of all IPOs during the entire 1980 – 2010 
period; the corresponding figure for 2001 – 2004 is 32 percent. Similarly, the number of 
IPOs that are backed by venture capital was 35 percent in the 1980 – 2010 period, and 37 
percent in our sample. Thus our IPO sample is smaller in terms of the number of IPOs, 
but is similar to the population in terms of composition of the issue or the return 
characteristics of the average IPO.  
 
1.4.2. Dependent Variables  
IPO underpricing. We use two measures of IPO underpricing, both of which 
indicate first-day trading period returns. Our absolute measure is the dollar difference 
between the first-day closing price and the offer price. The relative measure is the first-
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day closing price, less the offer price, divided by the offer price (e.g., Certo et al., 2003). 
Offer prices were collected from FactSet and closing prices were obtained from CRSP.   
 
Stock liquidity. We used the Amihud liquidity measure (Amihud, 2002; Goyenko 
et al., 2009), which is a low-frequency (e.g., daily) price impact proxy that includes the 
absolute (or percentage) price change per dollar of the daily trading volume. Following 
Amihud (2002), we took the natural logarithm of the measure to capture liquidity, 
defined as follows: 
Liquidity = Average [|rd| / Volumed], 
where |rd| is the absolute return on a stock on day d, and Volumed is the daily volume in 
dollars. The average is calculated over all non-zero days, and a smaller liquidity value 
implies a lower price impact. 
 
We calculated average liquidity estimates using daily stock returns and dollar volumes 
for all trading days during the year after the date of the IPO (see Appendix B).
4
 As an 
illustration, liquidity equals .0005266 for Las Vegas Sands Corporation (an example of 
high liquidity) and it equals 1.461082 for BAM Entertainment Inc. (an example of low 
liquidity). To supplement our analyses and check the persistence of liquidity, we 
computed similar liquidity estimates two years and three years from the date of the IPO 
issue; we refer to these estimates as aftermarket liquidity. Prior literature uses several 
liquidity proxies to capture different benchmarks, such as the effective spread, realized 
                                                          
4
In line with extant research (e.g. Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990), we assume 250 trading days in a year. 
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spread, or price impact (Goyenko et al., 2009); as we did not have access to bid–ask 
quotes or intraday trading information, we rely on a well-accepted low-frequency price 
impact proxy of liquidity.   
 
1.4.3. Independent Variables 
              Inside director ratio. This ratio is the number of inside directors on the firm’s 
board, divided by the board size. This and all director ownership variables came from the 
firm’s prospectus, part of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings in the 
EDGAR database.   
Inside director equity. This ratio indicates the proportion of total shares owned by 
the inside directors at the time of the IPO.  
Outside director equity. This value is the proportion of total shares owned by the 
outside directors at the time of the IPO. Following Arthurs and colleagues (2008), we 
exclude affiliated directors (relatives, customers, former employees, lawyers, bankers, 
and suppliers) from our sample. The sample therefore comprises two types of outside 
directors: venture backed and non–venture backed. Venture-backed outside directors 
either own or have full voting power for the shares held by the venture capital firm. 
Following Baker and Gompers’s (2003) definition of outside directors as comprising 
quasi-outside directors (similar to affiliated directors, whom we exclude) and truly 
independent outside directors (including public and professional directors, private 
investors, and venture capitalists), we classify both venture-backed and non–venture-
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backed outside directors as outside directors, and calculate outside director ownership as 
the sum of their combined ownership stakes (see also Kroll et al., 2007).
5
 
1.4.4. Control Variables 
              Firm size. We control for firm size, because the greater information typically 
available about larger firms reduces information asymmetry. We assess this variable as 
the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the IPO firm (Welbourne and 
Andrews, 1996), and obtained the data from COMPUSTAT.  
Firm age. Older firms generally perform better than younger firms, both prior to 
and after an IPO (Ritter, 1998). We calculate firm age as the natural logarithm of the 
difference in years between the date of IPO and the firm’s founding date, and obtained 
this data from Jay R. Ritter’s website (Ritter, 2003). 
 Risk factors. To add the risk factors mentioned in the prospectus, we use the 
summative index recommended by Welbourne and Andrews (1996), which includes 
                                                          
5
 An example may clarify this tactic. Augustas Tai, an outside director with Blue Nile Inc. (IPO on May 20, 
2004), owned 18.6% of Blue Nile’s shares outstanding before the IPO. In addition, Trinity Ventures 
managed 18.6% of the funds.  Tai was a general partner of Trinity Ventures, so we included his 18.6% as 
outside director ownership instead of venture capital ownership.  Alternatively, we could consider such 
ownership venture capital ownership, but we argue that venture-backed outside directors are behaviorally 
more similar to other equity-owning independent outsiders than to other venture capital firms without board 
representation. Venture-backed outside directors likely take an active interest in running the IPO firm, play 
the same monitoring role, and have the same effect on information generation as other blockholding outside 
directors.   
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factors such as technological obsolescence, new products, etc. These data were included 
in the firm’s IPO prospectus available through EDGAR. 
               Firm performance. We use return on assets as a proxy for firm performance 
(e.g., Michaely and Shaw, 1995) and obtained the data from COMPUSTAT.  
             Founder. Founders affect the extent of underpricing, so we include the founder as 
a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the founder sits on the firm’s board at the time of the IPO 
and 0 otherwise (Certo et al., 2001). These data were available from the IPO prospectus 
Underwriter spread. This per-share fee is charged by the underwriter to float an 
issue; it represents the risk to underwriters of an offering (Arthurs et al., 2008). We use 
the natural logarithm of the underwriter spread, as obtained from FactSet. 
Dilution. Dilution measures the premium, above book value, that new investors 
pay for the offering. Managers are “less concerned about underpricing when they observe 
a significant increase in the wealth being raised” (Arthurs et al., 2008: 285). Therefore, 
dilution likely affects the amount of underpricing. We obtained these data from the IPO 
prospectus.  
Underwriter reputation. Underwriter prestige should reduce underpricing, though 
recent work suggests that prestigious underwriters also may have greater leverage to 
underprice (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Similarly, underwriter reputation could signal 
the quality of the IPO issue, thus influencing the level of investor demand and post-IPO 
stock liquidity. Underwriter reputation scores, obtained from Jay R. Ritter’s website 
(Ritter, 2003), are based on the index developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) and 
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Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). When an underwriter reputation ranking for a year is 
unavailable, we use the ranking for the immediately preceding year.  
Noncontingent compensation. This natural logarithm reflects the sum of the 
annual salary paid to the CEO and other members of the top management team (Arthurs 
et al., 2008), as obtained from the IPO prospectus.  
Contingent compensation. From the firm prospectus, we obtain the value of stock 
option grants to the CEO and the top management team during the year immediately 
preceding the IPO (Certo et al., 2003). Following Arthurs et al. (2008), we calculate 
stock option value as the natural logarithm of the product of each officer’s number of 
options and their listed price. 
Inside director start-up experience. This sum reflects the number of years of 
previous start-up experience that each inside director possesses. These and all other data 
regarding inside directors came from the IPO prospectus.  
Inside directors on other boards. This count measure reflects the number of other 
boards on which inside directors sit, which indicates their experience and expertise 
(Arthurs et al., 2008).   
Inside director tenure. This value is the average tenure of all inside directors. 
Inside director age. This value is the average age of all inside directors. Insider 
age, similar to insider tenure, provides a good indicator of the risk perceptions of inside 
directors and therefore of their intention to monitor the IPO process (Arthurs et al., 
2008). 
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Venture capital ownership. The proportion of total shares in the company owned 
by venture capitalists should be important because, as Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
argue, venture capitalists certify the value of an offering, which decreases information 
asymmetry and reduces underpricing. We obtained this information from the IPO 
prospectus.  
All institutional ownership. Following Schnatterly, et al. (2008), we control for 
ownership by all institutional investors in our first set of liquidity models (Table 1.3: 
Models 1–4). We compute total institutional investor ownership at the end of the year. 
However, institutional ownership is absent on the eve of the IPO, so we do not add it as a 
control to predict the level of underpricing. These and all institutional ownership data 
came from 13F filings within the Thomson Financial database. 
Largest institutional owner. Again following Schnatterly et al. (2008), we 
controlled for the largest institutional investor. The largest institutional owner holds a 
significant information advantage; the greater the percentage of shares held by the largest 
institutional owner, the lower the liquidity will be.  
All but largest institutional owner. This value is the equity ownership of all 
institutional investors except the largest institutional investor at the end of the year. 
Along with the largest institutional investor ownership, this variable is a control.  
Industry. Initial returns are higher in riskier firms, such that firms in technology 
industries may experience greater underpricing (Lowry and Murphy, 2007).Similarly, 
stock liquidity may vary by industry. We control for this factor using dummy codes that 
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represent the firms’ one-digit SIC classification (Barth et al., 1999), and was obtained 
from COMPUSTAT.  
Year. We include four year dummies to account for the year fixed effects.  
Insert Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 about here 
 
1.4.5. Analyses 
To test our hypotheses, we used hierarchical linear regression analyses. In Table 1.2, we 
present the results of our corporate governance variables of interest and both absolute and 
relative underpricing. In Tables 1.3 and 1.4, we present the results of our corporate 
governance variables of interest and stock liquidity while also controlling for aspects of 
institutional ownership known to affect liquidity. We conducted numerous tests including 
a variation inflation factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity (Neter, Wasserman, and 
Kutner, 1985), which suggested no severe cases. A Cook’s distance test (Cook and 
Weisberg, 1982) confirmed the absence of influential outliers. We tested for normality 
both graphically and using the D’Agostino test and made appropriate variable 
transformations (D’Agostino, Belanger, and D’Agostino, 1990). However, we still found 
evidence of heteroscedasticity, both graphically and with the Breusch-Pagan test 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1979). To adjust the standard errors and p-values, we ran the Huber 
robust correction for heteroscedasticity (Huber, 1967). Finally, to test the robustness of 
our results, we conducted numerous supplementary analyses for different periods of 
liquidity measures, among others. 
 
1.5. RESULTS 
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1.5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
We provide, in Table 1.1, the means, standard deviations, and correlations among 
variables in our model. Our mean liquidity value is .05, lower than the .01 for S&P 1500 
firms over the last two decades. Our average level of (relative) underpricing (26%) is 
somewhat higher than that of Arthurs et al. (2008) or Certo et al. (2001) but consistent 
with Filatotchev and Bishop’s (2002) mean of 29.6%. These authors suggest that 
underpricing levels may be increasing due to growing uncertainty and speculative trends 
in IPO markets. Our average inside director ownership level (18%) is slightly lower and 
our outside director ownership level (28%) is slightly higher than those of Arthurs et al. 
(2008) (33% and 22%, respectively), and our insider ratio (27%) is lower than the 39% 
identified by Certo et al. (2001). However, these studies refer to various IPO 
investigations, of which ours is the most recent. For example, among the other studies 
that examine the US IPO market, Arthurs et al. (2008) consider the period from 1990 to 
1994, Certo et al. (2001) consider 1990 to 1998 and Certo et al. (2003) consider 1996 to 
1997.  
 
1.5.2. Main effects. 
Table 1.2 contains the underpricing models, with a dependent variable of absolute 
underpricing in Models 1 and 2 and relative underpricing in Models 3 and 4. Reiterating 
prior findings, Hypothesis 1a predicts a negative relation between insider ratio and 
underpricing; our findings (Table 1.2, Model 2, β = .01, p> .05; Model 4, β = .01, p> .05) 
are consistent with Certo et al.’s (2001) result but not with Arthurs et al.’s (2008) finding 
that inside director ratio relates negatively to underpricing. Thus, insider ratio is not 
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associated with underpricing. Regarding the proposed negative relation between inside 
director ownership and underpricing in Hypothesis 1b, we do not find any support (Table 
1.2, Model 2, β = .03, p> .05; Model 4, β = -.02, p> .05), consistent with Filatotchev and 
Bishop (2002) and Arthurs, et al. (2008). Hence, inside director ownership is not 
associated with underpricing. In line with conventional theory, Hypothesis 1c predicts a 
negative relation between outside director ownership and underpricing, which was upheld 
for absolute underpricing (Model 2, β = -.08, p< .05; see Arthurs et al., 2008) but not for 
relative underpricing (Model 4, β = -.06, p> .05). All underpricing models in Table 1.2 
are highly significant. 
 
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 contain the results of our liquidity models; the dependent variable is 
Amihud’s (2002) liquidity measure. Recall that a low value on this measure indicates 
high liquidity, whereas a high value on this measure indicates low liquidity. In Tables 1.3 
and 1.4, we use the average liquidity estimates based on all trading days between the day 
of the IPO and one year later. In Table 1.3, we control for overall institutional ownership 
levels, and in Table 1.4, we consider the largest and all other institutional ownership 
separately in line with Schnatterly et al. (2008).   
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between underpricing and liquidity. We do 
find consistent and strong support for the effects of underpricing on liquidity in all four 
models across the different measures of underpricing and institutional ownership 
characteristics (Table 1.3, β = -.16, p< .001 and β = -.12, p< .05 for absolute and relative 
underpricing respectively in the presence of overall institutional ownership). Similarly, 
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we find consistent and strong support for this hypothesis even when we consider the 
informational advantages of the largest institutional owner (Table 1.4, β = -.15, p< .001 
and β = -.12, p< .01 for absolute and relative underpricing respectively in the presence of 
the largest institutional owner). 
 
Regarding the proposed negative relation between inside director ratio (Hypothesis 3a), 
inside director equity (Hypothesis 3b), and outside director equity (Hypothesis 3c), and 
liquidity, we do not find any support for inside director ratio and inside director equity in 
both Tables 1.3 and 1.4. However, we do find consistent and strong support for the 
effects of outside director ownership and liquidity in all four models across the different 
measures of underpricing and institutional ownership characteristics (Table 1.3, β = .13, 
p< .01 and β = .13, p< .01 for both absolute and relative underpricing in the presence of 
overall institutional ownership). Similarly, we find consistent and strong support for the 
effects of outside director ownership even when we consider the informational 
advantages of the largest institutional owner (Table 1.4, β = .10, p< .01 and β = .11, p< 
.01 for both absolute and relative underpricing in the presence of the largest institutional 
owner). All liquidity models in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 are highly significant. 
 
1.5.3. Controls. 
In addition to the hypothesized relationships, the regression analyses reveal some 
interesting insights based on the control variables used in the models. In the underpricing 
models in Table 1.2, firm size and firm performance are positively associated with 
underpricing; the results for firm size contradict the findings of Arthurs et al. (2008), 
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while the results for firm performance are consistent with their findings. In the liquidity 
models in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, firm size, firm performance, dilution, and underwriter 
reputation are all associated with higher liquidity while firm age has a negative influence 
on liquidity. More importantly, venture capital ownership and facets of institutional 
ownership also affect post-IPO liquidity. As expected, higher levels of venture capital 
ownership (in Table 1.3 only) and holdings of largest institutional owner (in Table 1.4) 
are associated with reduced liquidity. Additionally, overall levels of institutional 
ownership are positively associated with liquidity in all models in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. 
These findings are very consistent with both theory and previous findings regarding the 
effects of institutional ownerships in non-IPO contexts (Schnatterly et al., 2008).  
 
1.5.4. Economic significance. 
We have thus far discussed the statistical significance of our results. Of equal, if not 
greater importance, is the issue of the substantive or economic importance of the results 
as that allows us to look beyond the narrow, technical specifics of regression results. This 
is especially true in our case as we have a relatively small sample size. While in large 
samples (like national datasets) even very small changes may be strongly statistically 
significant but not economically significant, for small sample sizes (and a lot a control 
variables) lack of statistical significance does not necessarily imply a corresponding lack 
of economic importance. In addition, we do not have data on private firms, and it is 
therefore possible that results that are not statistically significant for this sample might 
still be both statistically and economically important if the entire population of firms 
could be considered. We therefore discuss the economic significance of our results. 
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To judge the impact of different predictors measured in different units (e.g., underpricing 
in dollars and ownership in percentage) in terms of a consistent metric like ‘multiples of 
standard deviation’, we use standardized coefficients (for both predictor and dependent 
variable) in reporting our regression results. Here raw regression coefficients (say ‘b’) are 
replaced by ‘b times s(X)/s(Y)’, where s(Y) is the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable, Y, and s(X) is the standard deviation of the predictor, X (this is equivalent to 
rescaling all regression variables to their z-scores by subtracting the mean and dividing 
by the standard deviation).  
 
In addition we have a log-linear model (i.e. dependent variable is logged). Therefore, for 
the underpricing – liquidity relation, the standardized or beta coefficient of -.16 (-.12 for 
relative underpricing) in Table 1.3 implies that the dependent variable (log of liquidity) 
increases by .16 times standard deviations for a one standard deviation increase in 
underpricing. While the absolute underpricing-liquidity coefficient varies between -.15 
and -.16 (in model 3, tables 1.3 – 1.4), the corresponding numbers for other important 
predictors / controls variables are -.15 (all but largest institutional owners), .10 (largest 
institutional owner), .10 to .13 (outside director equity), and .05 to .06 (venture capital 
ownership). Thus in terms of ‘relative importance’, both underpricing and all institutional 
owners have the largest effect in increasing liquidity, while the largest institutional owner 
and outside director equity have an equally strong but opposite effect that decreases 
liquidity.  
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To analyze the absolute economic importance of these predictors, we also ran 
(standardized) regressions of the same variables, this time with ‘raw’ liquidity values as 
the dependent variable. We find that a one standard deviation increase in underpricing 
increases liquidity by .07 standard deviations (though the results are now statistically 
insignificant). This number is economically significant as it implies an increase in 
liquidity (we take winsorized values) by approximately .006 (given a standard deviation 
of .08 for ‘raw’ liquidity), which is about thirty percent of the median value of liquidity 
(.02) for our sample. Thus there is a thirty percent increase in liquidity for a one standard 
deviation change in underpricing (i.e. US$ 9.17) (for mean liquidity of .05, it is a ten 
percent increase). The results are similar for all but largest institutional owners (beta = -
.06), while median liquidity decreases for largest institutional owner and outside director 
equity are by about 20 percent (8 percent for mean). For venture capital ownership 
though, the numbers do not appear economically significant due to very low effect sizes. 
 
There is yet another reason why the changes in liquidity have economic significance in 
our particular sample. The average liquidity for our sample of IPO firms is lower than the 
mean liquidity of large firms in the population (e.g., our mean is .05 and median is .02, 
compared to an average of .01 for S&P 1500 firms), likely because our sample firms are 
new and often small firms. Thus on the one hand their liquidity situation is likely to be 
more volatile and easily amenable to external influences (unlike large firms), and on the 
other, even small changes (e.g., due to underpricing) may have a magnified effect 
because of the low mean liquidity levels of these firms (which gives high ‘absolute 
values’), with important implications for post-IPO survival (as we discuss later).  
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1.5.5. Robustness checks. 
As noted earlier, we conduct numerous robustness checks. First, we compute the 
aftermarket liquidity estimates (i.e., the liquidity estimates two years and three years from 
the date of the IPO). Earlier, we had calculated liquidity for year one as an average based 
on daily stock returns and dollar volumes for the 250 trading days following the date of 
the IPO. We now compute liquidity estimates for year two in two ways – as an average 
based on all 500 trading days following the date of the IPO, and as an average based on 
trading days 251-500. Similarly, we compute year three liquidity based on all 750 trading 
days, as well as trading days 501-750. We find strong correlations (p< .001) between year 
one liquidity and liquidity estimates based on days 251-500 (r = .99) and days 501-750 (r 
= .85), as well as between liquidity estimates for days 251-500 and days 501-750 (r = 
.87). Of course the correlations based on all 500 or all 750 trading days are even higher. 
This confirms our conjectures regarding the “stickiness” of liquidity. We also find that 
our earlier regression results remain unchanged for both liquidity estimates for years two 
and three. Both absolute and relative underpricing are positively related to liquidity, 
while outside director ownership significantly reduces liquidity. As before, we find no 
relationship between liquidity and board insider proportion, or liquidity and board insider 
ownership.  
 
Second, to ensure models were not unduly influenced by outliers, we winsorize the top 
and bottom 1% of our observations, based on (absolute) underpricing values. As before 
we find a statistically significant negative relation between (absolute) underpricing and 
outside director equity, but not for inside director ratio/ownership. We then regress 
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liquidity on absolute underpricing and find a strong positive relationship between 
(absolute) underpricing and liquidity. The same models reveal a significant negative 
relationship between outside director ownership and liquidity, but we again fail to find 
any relation between inside director ratio/ownership and liquidity. Next, we winsorize the 
top and bottom 1% of observations based on (relative) underpricing values. As in Table 
2, we find no relationship between outside director ownership and (relative) underpricing, 
yet we find a strong and expected relationship between (relative) underpricing and 
liquidity and between outside director ownership and liquidity.   
 
Third, it may have occurred to the reader that larger firms may have both higher 
underpricing and higher liquidity, and hence could be driving our results. Therefore, even 
though we controlled for firm size in both the underpricing and liquidity equations, we 
check if the ownership–underpricing–liquidity relationships may be driven by firm size. 
We first perform a quartile split on firm size and run the models with four dummies for 
firm size, each representing one of the four size quartiles. We also control for nonlinear 
size specifications by including the square of size as an additional control. Again, our 
results hold. Finally, with a median split by size, we conduct a Chow test to determine if 
the regression coefficients differ across the two groups (Rediker and Seth, 1995). We find 
no significant difference in the coefficient estimates between the two groups for (relative) 
underpricing, inside director ratio, inside director ownership, or outside director 
ownership. For (absolute) underpricing, there is weak evidence (p< .10) of a difference in 
the coefficient estimates. Therefore, we infer that firm size is not driving our 
underpricing–ownership / liquidity relationships.  
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Fourth, we used the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated value of 
stock option grants in the year prior to the IPO, with the assumption that the IPO firm’s 
stock price appreciates until its expiration at a compound annual rate of 10% (Certo et al., 
2003). We take the natural logarithm of this measure. Our results hold across all models. 
Finally, both underpricing and liquidity may vary by exchanges, so we introduce a 
dummy variable to denote the exchange that lists the IPO firm. Following Bradley and 
Jordan (2002), we assign a value of 1 if the IPO is listed on NASDAQ and 0 otherwise 
(i.e., listed on NYSE or AMEX). Our underpricing and liquidity results remain 
unchanged for all models.  
 
1.6. CONCLUSION 
1.6.1. Review. 
Our results largely support previous findings. Specifically, we find that inside director 
ratio and ownership do not affect IPO underpricing, but the presence of outside directors 
with equity reduces it. Following Arthurs et al., (2008), we surmise that monitoring by 
outside directors is an important activity in the IPO context, in contrast with those that 
suggest outside directors may not monitor during an IPO (Certo et al., 2001).  We also 
highlight how underpricing and liquidity are related; specifically, we identify a potential 
benefit associated with underpricing. Consistent with previous research that has 
documented the numerous advantages of liquidity, we find that IPO firms that went 
bankrupt had statistically lower levels of liquidity in comparison to those that survived. 
For example, the 33 firms that eventually went bankrupt as of 2009, had an average 
liquidity of 2.06 a year after the IPO, while the 384 surviving firms had an average 
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liquidity of .12 during the same period (where a higher value indicates lower liquidity). 
This trend persisted in years two and three. In addition, our robustness tests indicated that 
the presence of outside directors with equity reduces aftermarket liquidity for up to three 
years after the IPO. Director ownership in the IPO context is much higher than in a 
publicly traded firm. Outside director ownership is fairly significant in our sample, which 
likely accounts for the liquidity effect. Thus, though monitoring by outsider directors 
enables IPO firms to leave less money on the table in the short run, it also forces them to 
forego the substantial advantages of stock liquidity in the long run. 
 
We speculate that our non-findings regarding the inside director–liquidity relationship 
might relate to the presence of at least four groups of informed investors in an IPO: inside 
directors, outside directors, venture capital owners, and large institutional investors. 
While both the information and real friction effects may reduce liquidity when inside 
director ownership is high, where institutions trade more frequently than insiders, 
increased trading actually increases liquidity, and this institutional effect (rather than the 
inside director effect) might be strong enough to suppress the inside director ownership–
liquidity relationship (Rubin, 2007). In line with Schnatterly et al. (2008), we find a 
strong relation between total institutional ownership and liquidity in all our models.   
 
1.6.2. Endogeneity. 
One potential limitation of our study is endogeneity. Endogeneity in our particular 
context can arise from omitted variables bias. For example, studies (e.g., Zheng et al., 
2005) have found that IPOs with a lock-up restriction have both greater underpricing and 
37 
 
greater post-IPO trading volume (and hence liquidity). Since most IPOs these days 
feature a lock-up restriction, its presence may imply a spuriously strong positive relation 
between underpricing and liquidity (thereby weakening our findings, unless we also find 
evidence of that positive relation in non-lock-up IPOs). Similarly, other studies (e.g., 
Pham et al., 2003) find that certain firm characteristics influence both underpricing and/or 
ownership on the one hand, and liquidity on the other. For example, higher debt levels 
may trigger monitoring by debt-holders that reduce underpricing; conversely, debt-laden 
companies may want to rebalance their portfolios through future equity issues, leading to 
greater liquidity. Therefore it is likely that we may not find a positive underpricing-
liquidity relation in high debt companies (again weakening our findings). 
 
This study also ignores other potential determinants of underpricing and liquidity. For 
example, some studies note the impact of takeover defenses such as poison pills and 
staggered boards on underpricing. Field and Karpoff (2002) suggest that IPO firms 
should have in place at least one takeover defense when they go public so that managers 
can retain the private benefits of control. In such cases, takeover defenses can substitute 
underpricing as a means to reduce post-IPO monitoring (cf. Brennan & Franks, 1997), 
while the concomitant agency costs from high private benefits of control may dampen 
investor demand and subsequent liquidity. Thus the positive underpricing-liquidity 
relation is likely to be weaker (though still positive) in firms with takeover defenses. 
Market monitoring and liquidity can have other determinants. Stock liquidity levels may 
be affected by firm characteristics (e.g., size) and offer choices (e.g., underwriter quality), 
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which we did include as controls, but it may also be affected by other macroeconomic 
factors (e.g., hot or cold markets, market volatility, and / or interest rates). 
 
1.6.3. Other limitations. 
Another limitation relates to the way we measure liquidity. As Amihud et al. (2005) 
contend, problems in measuring liquidity reduce power of tests used to assess possible 
impacts on liquidity. Besides, a single liquidity measure cannot capture all dimensions of 
liquidity, and the use of low-frequency data to create estimates (as we do here) further 
increases measurement noise. While we cross-check our results using the Amivest and 
Gibbs measures, future research might employ high-frequency datasets like NYSE’s 
Trade and Quote (TAQ) dataset and data disclosed under SEC regulation 11Ac1-5 
(Goyenko et al., 2009). Liquidity encompasses a number of transactional properties of 
markets (like tightness, depth and resiliency) and this makes it a slippery and elusive 
concept (Kyle, 1985). Besides, while the trading volume, volatility and price of an 
individual stock determine its liquidity to a large extent, stock liquidity is often not an 
attribute of a single asset, but co-move with each other (Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam, 2000). We need to consider these limitations in order to better 
understand the impact of ownership structure and underpricing on aftermarket liquidity. 
 
1.6.4. Future directions.  
With regard to further research, we recommend examinations of whether differences in 
stock liquidity affect post-IPO firm survival. In our sample of 417 IPOs, as of 2009, 265 
firms remained as independent entities, whereas 152 had either failed (33 firms) or 
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merged (119 firms) with another firm. For these two groups of 265 and 152 firms, post 
hoc analyses revealed that liquidity is greater among the 265 independently surviving 
firms than the 152 bankrupt / merged firms. Moreover, within the 152 firms, the 33 
bankrupt firms had lower liquidity than the 119 merged firms (also see Appendix C). 
Another line of research could study the impact of stock liquidity on managerial 
discretion. For example, studies investigate stock market liquidity as a decision variable 
to determine firm payout policies (Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2007), which might be 
extended to study managerial choices about capital structure, investment decisions, and 
so on. Because liquidity decreases the cost of raising new capital (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986), further studies could also examine its implications for corporate 
strategy decisions, including R&D expenditures or mergers and acquisitions.  
 
In conclusion, our study provides evidence that the degree of IPO underpricing and (in 
certain cases) the pre-IPO ownership structure determine how liquid the IPO firm’s stock 
will be in the long-run. We also aver that extant management research has not fully 
resolved the knotty puzzle of IPO underpricing, primarily because it has looked only at 
parts of a more general problem. By integrating ideas about governance, underpricing and 
liquidity, and by refocusing attention from the short to the long-run, we provide greater 
evidence about the nature, causes and implications of the underpricing phenomenon, as 
well as a unifying perspective. The introduction of stock liquidity into the underpricing 
framework causes a four-fold increase in model significance, clearly indicating where the 
IPO explanation lies. Stock liquidity is therefore able to provide a new and rather radical 
explanation for the wide prevalence of first-day underpricing among IPO firms. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
SIGNALING TYPE AND MARKET PERFORMANCE IN IPO FIRMS 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
2.1.1. Information asymmetry in the IPO context. 
The correct valuation of an initial public offering (IPO) often poses a significant 
challenge for its investors. In general, there is little publicly available information about 
firm quality and prospects, operating histories are short, past earnings may be window-
dressed, and assets in place are likely negligible (Guo, Lev and Zhou, 2005), making IPO 
firms suffer from the liability of market newness. This information asymmetry may give 
rise to two types of opportunistic behavior, adverse selection (hidden information) and 
moral hazard (hidden action) (e.g., Bergen, Dutta and Walker, 1992). While hidden 
action (i.e. postcontractual agency problem) in an IPO setting arises after the principal 
and agent have already entered into a relation (i.e. investors have bought shares at an 
IPO), hidden information (i.e. precontractual agency problem) arises before investors 
have subscribed to IPO shares. IPO firms also face a multiple agency problem (Arthurs, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz and Johnson, 2008). This arises from the multiplicity of actors (e.g., 
inside and outside directors, venture capitalists, investment banks, investors etc.) with 
divergent goals and agenda, the dual roles of principal and agent some of these actors 
(e.g., venture capitalists)take on, and the monitoring of investment bank agents by 
managerial agents like board insiders.  
 
2.1.2. Underperformance in IPOs.  
Such informational inefficiencies, risks and goal-conflicts in the IPO market, among 
other causes, have led researchers to find evidence of  long-run underperformance among 
IPO firms (Ritter, 1991), and prompted Wall Street brokers to joke that IPO stands for 
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“It’s Probably Overpriced” (Jenkinson and Ljunqvist, 2001). Several subsequent studies 
in other countries and time periods have confirmed this so-called “new issues puzzle” 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Besides, evidence of this consistent underperformance has 
been recorded both in terms of adverse share price movements and post-IPO operating 
performance measures like operating return on assets and operating cash flows deflated 
by total assets(Jain and Kini, 1994).  
 
2.1.3. Signaling in IPOs. 
This context of information asymmetry and possible underperformance forces firms to 
employ mechanisms that can reassure uninformed investors who otherwise fear the 
‘winner’s curse’ (Rock, 1986), i.e. ending up with the full quota of unattractive offerings 
while competing with informed investors (e.g., institutional investors) for the attractive 
IPOs. Hidden action agency problems are solved using behavior-based and outcome-
based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989), while hidden information problems are solved by 
signaling, or screening, or providing opportunities for self-selection, or by a combination 
of more than one of these mechanisms (Bergen et al., 1992).
6
 The use of signals to 
address problems of information asymmetry and IPO performance has been quite popular 
in IPO research.
7
 Thus research has examined how signals address short-term measures 
                                                          
6
 Hidden action models, which have much in common with the positive branch of agency theory, are 
outside the scope of this paper. 
7
 While some IPO research in management has explicitly applied signaling theory (e.g., Sanders and 
Boivie, 2004), many others have used signals without formally employing a signaling framework (e.g., 
Heeley, Matusik and Jain, 2007), or indirectly studied the effect of signals on investors while framing it 
differently (e.g., Certo, Covin, Daily, Cannella and Dalton, 2003, who use behavioral decision theory), or 
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of IPO performance like proceeds raised, underpricing, price premium and market 
valuation, as well as long-term measures based on criteria like accounting returns (e.g., 
return on equity), market reactions (e.g., holding period returns) and survival (Certo, 
Holcomb and Holmes, 2009).  
 
2.1.4. Research streams on signaling in IPOs. 
To address performance issues across one or more of these short and long-term 
dimensions, several streams of IPO research have emerged using corporate governance, 
upper echelons, social influence and innovation perspectives (Certo et al., 2009). 
Signaling research using a corporate governance perspective has studied how 
mechanisms like stock-based incentives (Sanders and Boivie, 2004), board structures 
(Arthurs et al., 2008; Certo, 2003), ownership (Certo et al., 2003), founder status (Certo, 
Covin, Daily and Dalton, 2001) etc. affect IPO performance. Other signaling research has 
used perspectives like upper echelons (e.g., signaling by top management team – Higgins 
and Gulati, 2006), social influence (e.g., signaling by venture capitalists, investment 
banks and alliance partners – Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003) 
and innovation (e.g., signaling by R&D expenditures and patents – Hsu and Ziedonis, 
2007; Heeley et al., 2007). Still others have used unique perspectives like underpricing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
explained the power of signals using multiple theoretical frames (e.g., Higgins and Gulati, 2006, who use 
both signaling and upper echelons theories; Certo, 2003, who add institutional and sociological 
perspectives to signaling theory). In our reference to signaling research in management, we include such 
studies where signals and / or signaling theory have only been indirectly employed, or employed alongside 
other theories. 
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(Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) and dividend policy (Downes 
and Hienkel, 1982) to explain IPO firm performance. 
 
2.1.5. Signal classification.  
Yet this research has overlooked several important aspects. First, little management 
research looks at whether signals can be grouped. This is an important omission, as 
classifying signals according to common characteristics (like cost) has significant 
managerial implications in terms of whether, when and how much firms need to invest in 
developing signals, and how these decisions are likely to influence subsequent firm 
performance. Here we follow Kirmani and Rao (2000), and classify signals into two 
types: default-independent (hence DI) and default-contingent (hence DC). For DI signals, 
the firm incurs monetary loss independent of whether it defaults on its claim, while DC 
signals are costly only when the firm actually defaults. Besides being theoretically 
grounded, this classification is also relevant for managers, as DI signals require up-front 
expenditure, and are therefore cash-intensive, while DC signals involve losses to IPO 
owners only if future profit expectations are not met (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). We 
choose six commonly used IPO signals, namely patents, underpricing, underwriter 
reputation, inside director ownership, outside director ownership and venture capital 
ownership. We categorize the first three signals as DI and the last three as DC, and show 
that DI signals act as more credible indicators of firm value than DC signals.  
 
2.1.6. Signal characteristics. 
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Second, we not only argue that DI and DC signals differ on when and whether they spend 
money, but also discuss how this conceptual distinction predicts basic underlying 
differences in signal dimensions that in turn determine signal strength and investor 
reactions. This is important, as current management research has studied the effects of 
individual signals without considering the underlying characteristics common to all 
signals, and how differences in these characteristics determine the strength of a signal for 
firm performance. Building on previous literature (e.g., Heil and Robertson, 1991; 
Spence, 1974), we collate five broad dimensions - cost, clarity, consistency, commitment 
and visibility - and then assign scores to the three DI and three DC signals across various 
sub-dimensions within each of these five main dimensions (see Table 2.3). Our 
theoretical framework and empirical findings both suggest that DI signals are more 
costly, clear, consistent, committed and visible compared to DC signals, making them 
more powerful predictors of IPO firm quality for uninformed investors.  
 
2.1.7. Liquidity as a performance metric. 
Third, we introduce a new measure of IPO performance, namely post-IPO stock liquidity. 
Liquidity is the ease of trading a security (Amihud and Mendelson, 1988). Technically, it 
can be defined in terms of price impact, or the daily price response associated with one 
dollar of trading volume (Amihud, 2002). Several studies contend that obtaining liquidity 
is one of the most important reasons for a private firm to go public (e.g., Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1988). Liquidity creates public shares that IPO firms can use in future 
acquisitions, and also enhances the value of equity holdings of pre-IPO owners (Brau and 
Fawcett, 2006). Liquidity enables effective market monitoring and stronger managerial 
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incentives by incorporating more information into stock prices (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993), reduces the transaction costs of future equity issues for IPO firms that go for a 
multi-stage sale policy (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995), decreases required returns while 
increasing firm value (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) and enhances the effectiveness of 
external governance mechanisms such as takeovers and proxy contests (Tadesse, 2005).  
 
2.1.8. Market-based performance measures. 
Finally, our premise is that the effect of signals on IPO performance is best gauged 
through market-based measures that directly reflect investor reactions to signals, rather 
than measures like return on equity or survival where the link between investor sentiment 
and performance metric is more difficult to establish. In addition to introducing stock 
liquidity as a market-based performance measure, we bring together three other market 
measures, namely gross proceeds during an IPO, market value of the IPO firm at the end 
of the year of the IPO, and Tobin’s Q at the end of the second year after the year of the 
IPO (e.g., 31
st
 December, 2003, for an IPO issued in 2001).
8
 By employing multiple 
direct measures of market performance that span a broad temporal continuum (short-
term, medium-term and long-term), we are able to provide a stronger test of signaling 
effects than other IPO studies in management that usually employ a single dependent 
variable (e.g., Certo et al., 2003; Arthurs et al., 2008; Walters, Kroll and Wright, 2010). 
For any given signal, the results are largely consistent for the different performance 
                                                          
8
 Other IPO performance metrics measuring investor sentiment are underpricing (e.g., Certo et al., 2001) 
and price premium /dilution (e.g., Certo et al., 2003); here we include underpricing as a signal rather than 
as a performance measure (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber, 1989), while dilution is used as a control variable 
(e.g., Arthurs et al., 2008).  
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metrics measured at different time points after IPO, suggesting that initial market 
sentiments create ‘information and availability cascades’(explained later) that sustain the 
‘buzz’ about the signaling firm (Pollock and Gulati, 2007; Pollock, Rindova and 
Maggitti, 2008).  
 
In sum, while extant management research has shown that signals can mitigate the pre-
IPO information asymmetry problem, no attempt has been made to classify these signals 
into groups based on their underlying nature and characteristics, and then to show how 
signaling type can differentially influence market reaction and therefore post-IPO firm 
value in the near and long term. Hence our main research question: Are DI signals more 
powerful than DC signals in improving post-IPO firm performance? 
 
2.1.9. Contributions.  
Our study is important from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Theoretically, our 
study provides a classification of IPO signals based on whether the loss of money due to 
signaling is a sunk cost or depends on future profitability, and also on the clarity, 
consistency, commitment and visibility aspects of these signals. We find that up-front 
expenditures and other favorable characteristics of DI signals that make them more costly 
also make them more credible to the investing public, who may not be able to grasp the 
more subtle reasoning of DC signals (Rao, Qu and Ruekert, 1999). In sum, there is no 
gain without pain in case of IPO signals. 
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Practically, our study provides a preliminary framework for doing a cost-benefit analysis 
of different signal types. We suggest that pre-IPO managers need to weigh the likely 
improvement in firm value from DI signals against the cash-intensive nature of these 
signals. DI signals will be cost-effective for high quality firms where initial IPO investors 
go for a repeat purchase, or where such signals create information cascades about firm 
reputation for future investors (e.g., Kirmani and Rao, 2000). For example, signaling 
models of underpricing (a DI signal) suggest that underpricing is more beneficial for 
firms that go for a seasoned equity offer in the near future, as it allows them to recoup the 
initial costs of signaling (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). Conversely, DC signals being less 
costly, managers may also think of ways of using them more effectively (e.g., owner-
managers entering into employment bonds, or subscribing to stock options, or voluntarily 
committing to a longer lock-up period).
9
 
 
2.2. THEORY  
 
2.2.1. Signaling theory.  
We use signaling theory (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973, 1974; Heil and Robertson,1991) 
as our theoretical point of reference. We follow Spence - whose early seminal work on 
signaling theory examined how in a competitive marketplace potential employees signal 
quality through costly activities like obtaining a degree - and define signals as “those 
observable characteristics attached to the individual that are subject to manipulation by 
                                                          
9
 The lock-up or lock-in period is a specified period of time (180 days in the USA) for which the original 
IPO owners cannot sell their shares after the IPO. 
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him” (Spence, 1973: 357). Thus signals should be both observable and alterable. Adding 
to the ‘observable’ attribute, later scholars have viewed signals as variables that are 
observable only at low measurement costs for the receiver, but which nevertheless are 
capable of changing the receiver’s probability distribution of unobservable variables that 
such signals represent (Long, 2002). Similarly, scholars have stressed the ‘alterable’ 
attribute of signals by referring to them as “firm characteristics which are directly 
controllable by the firm at the time of the equity issue” (Downes and Heinkel, 1982: 3), 
or by explaining how firms undertake deliberate and strategic actions to change the 
perceptions of external parties (Gulati and Higgins, 2006). 
 
2.2.2. Benefits of signaling. 
The wide use of signaling to address the adverse selection problem at an IPO (e.g., Brau 
and Fawcett, 2006; Heeley et al., 2007; Leland and Pyle, 1977) is because signals enable 
the issuing firm to convey its true quality to investors in many ways. First, powerful 
signals create a ‘separating equilibrium’, whereby pursuing a signaling strategy assures 
maximum payoffs for high-quality firms while having a non-signaling strategy is 
optimum for low-quality firms (Spence, 1973).
10
 Second, signals play an important role 
in attracting investor attention, increasing the visibility of the IPO firm, and reducing 
uncertainty (Pollock and Gulati, 2007). Third, the initial signal-induced demand often 
creates a buzz among IPO investors, analysts and the media, creating a self-sustaining 
                                                          
10
 Conversely, a ‘pooling equilibrium’ occurs when the gains from falsely claiming high quality outweigh 
the losses from being discovered, and customers cannot distinguish between high and low quality sellers 
(Kirmani and Rao, 2000). 
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pattern of demand even in the post-IPO period through mechanisms like information 
cascades and availability cascades (Pollock and Gulati, 2007; Pollock et al., 
2008).
11
Fourth, signals often involve certification by third parties after a detailed and 
exhaustive due-process examination (Ndofor and Levitas, 2004), and also transfer risks 
from the buyer to the seller (Sanders and Boivie, 2004). Fifth, IPO firms can use signals 
to gain ‘strategic legitimacy’ in terms of resources, roles and endorsement(Gulati and 
Higgins, 2006; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).
12
 Finally, signals are used by the investing 
public to form the basis for firm reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  
 
2.2.3. Signaling dimensions.  
However, these signaling benefits at IPO are likely to vary by the power (strength) of the 
signal. To start with, DI signals involving upfront expenditure are likely to be more 
credible indicators for IPO investors than DC signals whose monetary loss depends on 
future profits. More importantly, however, this definitional difference between DI and 
DC signals reflects other, more fundamental, differences in their underlying nature that 
actually determine the relative power of these two signal groups. We collate five 
                                                          
11
 Both information and availability cascades describe how social influences affect the focal actor’s  
behavior under uncertainty; however, information cascades result when actors strive to gain information 
advantage, while availability cascades are generated from the need to reduce cognitive effort and act in 
ways acceptable to the majority (Pollock et al., 2008).  
 
12
 Strategic legitimacy involves firms that actively endeavor to secure resources, unlike institutional 
legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), wherein firms adjust to existing belief structures in a relatively 
passive way (Gulati and Higgins, 2006). 
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common, underlying dimensions of all signals: cost, clarity, consistency, commitment 
and visibility. Our thesis is that higher a signal’s additive scores on these five dimensions, 
the greater its power to elicit positive investor reactions that lead to increased market 
value for the firm. We first explain these five dimensions of signal power and then 
discuss the relative strengths of our three DI and three DC signals on these five 
parameters.
13
 
The cost of a signal (e.g., Kirmani and Rao, 2000) includes not only the actual monetary 
expenditure the firm undertakes to develop and transmit the signal, but also the 
opportunity costs of lost investments, as well as non-financial costs (e.g., spending social 
capital) to build a network of relationships (e.g., with underwriters or venture 
capitalists).Besides, the actual costs may vary from one firm to another (e.g., for any 
strong signal, a low-quality firm will find it much more costly to develop the signal than 
a high-quality firm). Signal clarity denotes that a signal is unambiguous and has a known 
cause (Heil and Robertson, 1991). A clear signal should also be measurable, should not 
be open to dual interpretation, and should have lesser noise due to its strong causal 
attribution. Consistency of signal looks at whether the signal deteriorates over time as 
investors have actual experiences about the firm (e.g., Pollock and Gulati, 2007). Signal 
commitment (Heil and Robertson, 1991) measures the time and effort the firm expends to 
develop the signal as well as its intentions to continue using the signal in future, while 
                                                          
13
  Even within DI and DC signaling types, signals vary across these five dimensions; however, the within-
type differences are much smaller than the between-type differences(see Table 2.3), and hence that analysis 
is kept outside the purview of this paper.  
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signal visibility looks at a signal’s ability to attract investor attention as well as to retain it 
(e.g., via information and availability cascades).  
 
2.3. HYPOTHESIS 
2.3.1. Patents (first DI signal). 
Signaling via patents, our first DI signal, is costly because patenting typically requires 
significant investments in R&D and innovation, which includes developing technological 
capabilities and nurturing scientific talent (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999). Besides, the 
legalities of the patent application process can make it both complex and costly. Patents 
also act as clear signals as they can be readily linked to underlying innovation levels 
(Griliches, 1990), making them strong indicators of firm technological competence. 
Patents are also quantifiable (“the sheer numerosity of patents” - Long, 2002: 651) and 
directly measurable. However, the skewness in patent values (i.e., some patents are 
highly valuable, while many others have very low values) suggests that patents may have 
dual implications that can somewhat reduce the otherwise high clarity of patent signals. 
The fact that patents are intangible assets with little depreciation indicates high signal 
consistency, though the effect is weakened if investors subsequently suffer due to poor 
firm performance. Patent signals also denote high commitment as they usually entail 
large sunk costs; also, firms that have made specific investments and built scale will not 
be able to significantly change their investment trajectories in future. Finally, patents as 
signals have high visibility both during the IPO (e.g., via road shows, prospectus etc.) and 
after it (e.g., via annual statements, lawsuits against infringement etc.). 
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2.3.2. Underpricing (second DI signal). 
Underpricing, our second DI signal, involves high opportunity costs. Loughran and Ritter 
(2002), for example, estimated that during 1990-1998 the average US IPO left $ 9.1 
million on the table, a number that was about twice as large as the fees paid to investment 
bankers. Underpricing is also a clear signal. It unambiguously reflects firm quality as 
only good firms can recoup the cost of underpricing via subsequent issues (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989). It is also a measurable and well-researched variable with clear 
implications for investor demand (e.g., underpricing ensures oversubscription of IPO 
shares - Brennan and Franks, 1997). The underpricing signal also shows high consistency 
in that the effect of this signal persists in the post-IPO period (Pollock and Gulati, 2007). 
Likely causes of this persistence are that initial underpricing provides greater breadth and 
diffusion of post-IPO trading (Booth and Chua, 1996), and generates greater analyst 
following in the post-IPO market (Rajan & Servaes, 1997). Underpricing also signals the 
focal firm’s commitment to go for a secondary equity offering in future, or to 
subsequently engage in acquisitions (e.g., Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). Finally, the 
underpricing signal is highly visible as it entails an extreme price reaction that attracts 
initial investor attention and leaves a sweet taste in their mouths (Welch, 1989), creating 
a self-sustaining chain of demand (Pollock and Gulati, 2007).  
 
2.3.3. Underwriter reputation (third DI signal).  
Our third and final DI signal, underwriter reputation, is also a powerful signal. Typically, 
underwriter spread or commission is very high in the US market (about seven percent of 
gross proceeds on average), and such fees will be even higher when the lead underwriter 
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is a ‘bulge bracket’ investment bank (Chen and Ritter, 2000).14 Apart from being costly, 
the underwriting signal also has high clarity. The selection of the underwriter is a two-
way process that entails thorough evaluation and due diligence by the underwriter (e.g., 
Stuart et al., 1999), providing endorsement legitimacy to the IPO firm (Gulati and 
Higgins, 2006). Besides, reputed underwriters only choose less risky IPOs (Carter and 
Manaster, 1990), removing any ambiguity about firm quality. The underwriter signal also 
shows high consistency as underwriter reputation rankings are fairly stable over time and 
reputed underwriters are likely to actively monitor and influence post-IPO firm 
performance (e.g., via stabilization activities). Selection of a reputed underwriter also 
shows significant firm commitment in terms of social and financial capital invested, 
while the prominent display of big names like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and 
Merrill Lynch on the left of the cover of the prospectus, as well as the road shows, are 
likely to bring high visibility to the issuing firm.  
 
2.3.4. Director ownership (first two DC signals). 
We next discuss the DC signals. The two director-related DC signals (inside director 
ownership and outside director ownership) are costly to IPO firm directors because they 
now share in the substantial risks such firms face around an IPO. The typically high 
director ownership at IPO further underlines this risk. However, it does not involve 
immediate monetary involvement, and is costly only in case of future loss. In other 
                                                          
14
  Hiring reputed underwriters also has an indirect cost as they often insist on higher underpricing so that 
they can pass on the benefits to their favored clients, and also possibly need to undertake lesser post-IPO 
stabilization activities (Chen and Ritter, 2000).  
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words, director ownership at IPO does not involve upfront costs. The director ownership 
signal also lacks clarity for IPO investors. IPO actors often don several hats, giving rise 
to a multiple agency problem (Arthurs et al., 2008). Thus inside directors act both as 
managerial agents and as principals monitoring other agents, while outside directors may 
not monitor during an IPO as they still lack a clear role as agents of shareholders (Arthurs 
et al., 2008; Certo et al., 2001). Besides, directors with very high ownership may extract 
advantages from access to private information (e.g., resort to insider trading), worsening 
the information asymmetry problem such signals set out to redress in the first place (e.g., 
Chiang and Venkatesh, 1988). The director ownership signal also lacks consistency. For 
example, as new investors come in at later stages, there may be conflict of interests with 
pre-IPO owners on matters of firm control. Also, increasing ownership can motivate IPO 
directors to take sub-optimal decisions where such decisions involve significant personal 
risks (cf. Wright, Ferris, Sarin& Awasthi, 1996). IPO directors often sell significant 
equity stakes after lock-up, ensuring low signal commitment. Ownership signals also lack 
the kind of visibility associated with elite investment banks, a steep price rise on day one 
that is widely reported, or a breakthrough patent, and are usually reported in the 
prospectus along with sundry other items and footnotes. 
 
2.3.5. Venture capital ownership (third DC signal). 
Our third DC signal, venture capital ownership (e.g., Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Arthurs 
et al., 2008), share some of the attributes of director ownership signals. Venture capital 
ownership does not require any monetary expenditure over and above the venture 
capitalist’s initial staged financing of the IPO firm, making it a less costly signal. This 
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signal also lacks clarity. For one, venture capitalists as equity owners are principals in the 
firms they invest in, but they are also agents of the investors in the venture capital firm 
(Pratt and Foreman, 2000). Also, they have representatives on the board of directors, and 
therefore have access to private information. Finally, venture capital firms usually require 
a quick return on their investments. This short-term perspective may motivate them to 
window-dress the IPO balance sheet, and to rush the private firm to a quick IPO which is 
then used by the venture capitalist as a mode of exit (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Fischer 
and Pollock, 2004).
15
The venture capital ownership signal is also inconsistent. Higgins 
and Gulati (2003), for example, find that any advantage of venture capital association is 
situation-specific, leading to IPO success only during cold markets. The fact that most 
venture capitalists sell their stakes either at or after the IPO further adds to this signal’s 
inconsistency and lack of commitment. The visibility of this signal, however, can be high 
if the firm is funded by a reputed venture capitalist. 
 
Integrating these discussions, our analyses of three DI signals (patents, underpricing and 
underwriter reputation) and three DC signals (inside director equity, outside director 
equity and venture capital ownership) in terms of five common underlying dimensions 
(cost, clarity, consistency, commitment and visibility) tell us that DI signals possess 
certain desirable attributes that DC signals do not, making DI signals more effective 
instruments in eliciting positive investor reactions and improving firm value at and after 
an IPO.  
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  Some authors (e.g., Jain and Kini,1995), however, believe that venture capitalists have incentives to 
monitor both before and after an IPO. 
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Hypothesis. DI signals are more powerful than DC signals in improving IPO firm 
performance. 
2.4. METHODS 
2.4.1. Data and Sample 
We collected data from the prospectuses filed by all firms that undertook IPOs in the U.S. 
market between 2001 and 2004, for a total of 493 firms, which provided the issue and 
first-day prices. We also collected data about insider ratios; equity ownership by inside 
directors, outside directors, and venture capital firms; stock option grants; annual salaries; 
insiders’ age, tenure, presence on other boards, and start-up experience; presence of the 
founder on the board; and dilution and risk factors. We downloaded patent data on 
assignees, number of patents granted, and citation count, from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) Patent Data Project website 
(https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads). Underwriter reputation 
scores were obtained from Jay R. Ritter’s website. For data about daily stock returns and 
the daily dollar trading volume, we turned to CRSP and computed the Amihud measure 
of stock liquidity (see Appendix B). Other data (e.g., to calculate Tobin’s Q) were 
obtained from Compustat. Seventy-six firms in our sample had missing data, which 
yielded a sample of 417 firms. Of these, we removed another 105 firms belonging to 
industrial sectors like financial services, utilities, real estate and mutual funds that are 
subject to unique government regulations. This gave us a final sample size of 312 firms, 
which is consistent with recent management research in the context of IPOs. For 
example, Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) have a sample size of 251, Certo et al. (2003) 
have 193, Arthurs et al. (2008) have 307, and Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine and Wright 
(2010) have 224.  
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2.4.2. Dependent Variables. 
              Gross proceeds. This measure, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of 
the product of the offer price and the number of shares sold, captures the capital raised at 
an offering, and is an indication of short-term IPO performance (Certo et al., 2009). This 
is obtained from FactSet. 
              Market value. This is the natural logarithm of the market value of the IPO firm 
as at the end of the year of the IPO, and is calculated as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the price as at that date (year-end closing price).Data are obtained from 
CRSP and Compustat.  
Liquidity. We used the Amihud liquidity measure (Amihud, 2002; Goyenko, 
Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009), which is a low-frequency (e.g., daily) price impact proxy 
that shows the absolute (or percentage) price change per dollar of daily trading volume. 
Following Amihud (2002), we took the natural logarithm of the measure to capture 
liquidity, defined as Liquidity = Average [|rd| / Volumed],where |rd| is the absolute return 
on a stock on day d, and Volumed is the daily volume in dollars. We calculated average 
liquidity estimates using daily stock returns and dollar volumes for all trading days 
during the year starting the day after the date of the IPO (see Appendix B).
16
 As an 
illustration, liquidity equals .0005266 for Las Vegas Sands Corporation (an example of 
high liquidity) and it equals 1.461082 for BAM Entertainment Inc. (an example of low 
liquidity). Prior literature uses several liquidity proxies to capture different benchmarks, 
                                                          
16
 The Amihud ratio actually measures illiquidity rather than liquidity. So a high ratio value indicates high 
price impact and low liquidity, and vice versa. Also, in line with extant research, we assume 250 trading 
days in a year. 
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such as the effective spread, realized spread, or price impact (Goyenko et al., 2009); as 
we did not have access to bid–ask quotes or intraday trading information, we rely on a 
well-accepted low-frequency price impact proxy of liquidity.   
Tobin’s Q. We also calculate Tobin’s Q, probably the most popular 
hybrid(accounting and market-based) performance measure (Richard, Devinney, Yip and 
Johnson, 2009), and one that has been widely used in the IPO context (e.g., Welbourne 
and Andrews, 1996). We compute its value at the end of the second year following the 
year of IPO (e.g., 31
st
 December, 2003 for a stock issued in 2001). Following Villalonga 
(2004) and Khanna and Palepu (2000), we calculate Tobin’s Q as [(market value of 
equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt) / book value of assets], 
where market value of equity is calculated using closing stock prices on the last trading 
day of the year.  
 
2.4.3. Independent Variables. 
             Number of patents. This is the number of patents applied for by the IPO firm 
before the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), as obtained from the NBER 
website. To reduce skewness, we used the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
patents.  
           Underpricing. We define underpricing as the first-day closing price, less the offer 
price, divided by the offer price (e.g., Certo et al., 2003). Offer prices were collected 
from FactSet and closing prices were obtained from CRSP. 
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Underwriter reputation. Underwriter reputation can signal the quality of an IPO 
issue (Brau and Fawcett, 2006), thereby influencing the level of investor demand and 
post-IPO performance.  Underwriter reputation scores, obtained from Jay R. Ritter’s 
website (Ritter, 2003), are based on the index developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) 
and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and vary from a low of 1 to a high of 9. When an 
underwriter reputation ranking for a year is unavailable, we use the ranking for the 
immediately preceding year.  
Inside director equity. This ratio indicates the proportion of total shares owned by 
the inside directors at the time of the IPO.  
           Outside director equity. This is the proportion of total shares owned by the outside 
directors at the time of the IPO. Following Arthurs et al. (2008), we exclude affiliated 
directors (relatives, customers, former employees, lawyers, bankers, and suppliers) from 
our sample. Our sample therefore comprises two types of outside directors: venture 
backed and non–venture backed. Venture-backed outside directors either own or have full 
voting power for the shares held by the venture capital firm. Following Baker and 
Gompers’s (2003) definition of outside directors as comprising quasi-outside directors 
(similar to affiliated directors, who we exclude) and truly independent outside directors 
(including public and professional directors, private investors, and venture capitalists), 
we classify both venture-backed and non–venture-backed outside directors as outside 
directors, and calculate outside director ownership as the sum of their combined 
ownership stakes (cf. Kroll, Walters and Le, 2007). 
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Venture capital ownership. Venture capitalists certify the value of an offering, 
which decreases information asymmetry and improves investor sentiment and post-IPO 
firm value (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). From the prospectus we obtained information 
on the equity ownership of the venture capitalist at the time of the IPO.  
 
2.4.3. Control Variables. 
 
              Firm size. We control for firm size, because the greater information typically 
available about larger firms reduces information asymmetry. We assess this variable as 
the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the IPO firm (Welbourne and 
Andrews, 1996), and obtained the data from Compustat.  
Firm age. Older firms generally perform better than younger firms, both prior to 
and after an IPO (Ritter, 1998). We calculate firm age as the natural logarithm of the 
difference in years between the date of IPO and the firm’s founding date, and obtained 
this data from Jay R. Ritter’s website (Ritter, 2003). 
 Risk factors. To add the risk factors mentioned in the prospectus, we use the 
summative index recommended by Welbourne and Andrews (1996), which includes 
factors such as technological obsolescence, new products, etc. These data were included 
in the firm’s IPO prospectus available through EDGAR. 
Firm performance. We use return on assets as a proxy for firm performance 
(Michaely and Shaw, 1995), and obtained the data from Compustat.  
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Founder. Founders influence IPO firm performance, so we include the founder as 
a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the founder sits on the firm’s board at the time of the IPO 
and 0 otherwise (Certo et al., 2001). These data were available from the IPO prospectus. 
Dilution. Dilution measures the premium above book value that new investors pay 
for the offering, and this premium is likely to affect investor demand at the time of the 
IPO.  We obtained these data from the IPO prospectus.  
           Noncontingent compensation. This is the natural logarithm of the sum of the 
annual salary paid to the CEO and other members of the top management team (Arthurs 
et al., 2008), as obtained from the IPO prospectus.  
           Contingent compensation. From the firm prospectus, we obtained the value of 
stock option grants to the CEO and the top management team during the year 
immediately preceding the IPO (Certo et al., 2003). Following Arthurs et al. (2008), we 
calculate stock option value as the natural logarithm of the product of each officer’s 
number of options and their listed price.  
Inside director start-up experience. This sum reflects the number of years of 
previous start-up experience that each inside director possesses. These and all other data 
regarding inside directors came from the IPO prospectus.  
           Inside directors on other boards. This count measure reflects the number of other 
boards on which inside directors sit, which indicates their experience and expertise. 
          Inside director tenure. This value is the average tenure of all inside directors. 
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            Inside director age. This value is the average age of all inside directors. Insider 
age, similar to insider tenure, provides a good indicator of the risk perceptions of inside 
directors and therefore of their intention to monitor the IPO process (Arthurs et al., 
2008). 
Inside director ratio. This ratio is the number of inside directors on the firm’s 
board, divided by the board size.  
Exchange dummy. Since capital raised, market value and post-IPO liquidity may 
vary by exchange, we introduce a dummy variable to denote the exchange that lists the 
IPO firm. Following Bradley and Jordan (2002), we assign a value of 1 if the IPO is 
listed on NASDAQ and 0 otherwise (i.e., listed on NYSE or AMEX). This information is 
obtained from CRSP.  
All institutional investors. We control for total institutional investor ownership at 
the end of the year of the IPO. All institutional ownership data came from 13F filings 
within the Thomson Financial database. However, since institutional ownership is absent 
on the eve of the IPO, we do not include it as a control variable to predict gross proceeds.   
Industry. Initial returns are higher in riskier firms, such that firms in technology 
industries may experience greater underpricing (Lowry and Murphy, 2007).Similarly, 
stock liquidity may vary by industry. We control for this factor using dummy codes that 
represent the firms’ one-digit SIC classification (Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman, 
1999), and was obtained from Compustat.  
Year. We include four year dummies to account for the year fixed effects.  
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Insert Tables 2.1 and 2.2 about here 
 
2.4.5. Analyses 
To test our hypothesis, we used hierarchical linear regression analyses. We conducted 
numerous tests including a variation inflation factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity 
(Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1985), which suggested no severe cases. A Cook’s 
distance test (Cook and Weisberg, 1982) indicated the absence of influential outliers. 
However, on a graphical analysis, four values of patent count appeared very large. We 
log-transformed patent count to reduce the impact of these four observations, and also 
conducted additional analyses with raw patent count after removing these observations. 
We tested for normality both graphically and using the D’Agostino test and made 
appropriate variable transformations (D’Agostino, Belanger and D’Agostino, 1990). 
However, we still found evidence of heteroscedasticity, both graphically and with the 
Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). To adjust the standard errors and p-
values, we ran the Huber robust correction for heteroscedasticity (Huber, 1967). Finally, 
to test the robustness of our results, we conducted supplementary analyses. 
 
2.5. RESULTS 
 
2.5.1. Descriptive statistics. 
In Table 2.1 we provide the means, standard deviations and correlations among our 
variables. Our mean underpricing level is 26.4 percent, which is higher than that of 
Arthurs et al. (2008) or Certo et al. (2001), but close to Filatotchev and Bishop’s (2002) 
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mean of 29.6 percent. These authors suggest that underpricing levels may be increasing 
due to growing uncertainty and speculative trends in IPO markets. 45 percent firms in our 
sample have patents, with an average of 9.79 patents per firm (after removing four 
outliers; logged mean is 1.06). The mean underwriter reputation score is 8.07. Our 
average inside director ownership level (17.3 percent) is lower than, for example, Arthurs 
et al. (2008) (33 percent), while our outside director ownership (31.8 percent) and 
venture capital ownership (38.3 percent) are higher (24 percent and 22 percent 
respectively for Arthurs et al., 2008). We speculate these differences are due to our 
choice of a more recent IPO period (2001 to 2004) compared to those authors (who 
choose 1990 to 1994). Our mean raw liquidity value of 0.07 (logged mean is -3.69)is 
much lower compared to S&P 1500 firms (mean of .01). About 71 percent of IPO firms 
in our sample are listed on NASDAQ. 
 
2.5.2. Regressions. 
Models 1 to 4 in Table 2.2 depict the regression results using the four dependent 
variables. Within each model we run four regressions: the first with all controls, the 
second and third adding DI and DC signals respectively, and the fourth having all 
controls and main effects. Institutional ownership is not used as a control variable in 
Model 1 (using gross proceeds at IPO as the dependent variable) since institutional 
investors buy shares only in the post-IPO market. Our hypothesis that DI signals are more 
effective than DC signals in improving post-IPO market value is largely supported across 
all four models. While our sample size is 312 for models 1, 2, and 3, we lose 43 
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observations due to lack of data when calculating Tobin’s Q, giving a sample size of 269 
for model 4. 
 
2.5.3. Controls. 
In the control models, we find that firm size has a significant positive relation with gross 
proceeds raised, market value and post-IPO liquidity.
17
The high correlation between firm 
size and firm age (r = 0.46, p< .001) also tells us that larger firms are older firms. These 
suggest that large IPO firms have lesser information asymmetry problems, and so are 
more attractive to the lay investor. However, firm size is negatively related to Tobin’s Q, 
mirroring the findings of Welbourne and Andrews, 1996. We surmise that while the 
lesser information asymmetry of bigger firms increases their absolute market value, this 
better information availability also makes large firm market values closely resemble their 
book values. This lowers Tobin’s Q (the market to book ratio) even where market and 
book values are both high. Apart from firm size, we also find that dilution (difference 
between book value and offer price at an IPO) is positively related to all four dependent 
variables, implying that investors’ initial willingness to pay a premium over book value is  
a strong early indicator of future investor demand.  
 
2.5.4. Model significance. 
However, while overall R-square values range between 60 and 75 percent in the first 
three models for gross proceeds, market value and liquidity (refer to the sub-models with 
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 Since the Amihud measure of liquidity is actually a measure of illiquidity, the negative relation shown in 
the tables between firm size and liquidity is in effect a positive relation, i.e. liquidity increases with size. 
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all controls and regressors), the R-square for model 4 (Tobin’s Q) is only about 27 
percent. This is most likely because market signals well explain market value, but cannot 
explain Tobin’s Q components like the book value of preferred stock, debt and assets. 
Also possible is the explanation that over time (Tobin’s Q is measured at the end of the 
second year after the IPO) signals lose some of their explanatory power and / or 
exogenous variables come into play. Coming to our main results, we find strong support 
for our hypothesis. There are large increases in model R-square when we introduce the 
group of three DI signals. The respective R-square increases are 11.1 percent (gross 
proceeds), 10.85 percent (market value), 9.54 percent (liquidity), and 5.59 percent 
(Tobin’s Q), and these increases in model predictive power are all significant at p< .001. 
Conversely, for the DC group, there is little R-square increase from the control model. 
Here the R-square increases are 0.38 percent (p> 0.10) for model1, 0.70 percent (p> 0.10) 
for model 2, 0.91 percent (p> 0.10) for model 3, and 0.40 percent for model 4 (p> 0.10).  
 
2.5.5. Findings for DI signals. 
Individually too, all three DI signals have a strongly positive and fairly consistent impact 
on performance. Underwriter reputation is the strongest signal for improving gross 
proceeds (β = .36, p< .001), market value (β = .32, p< .001) and stock liquidity (β = -.31, 
p< .001).
18
These results are in line with our assessment of the characteristics of 
underwriter reputation in terms of cost, clarity, consistency, commitment and visibility 
aspects (see Table 2.3) as well as with the extant literature (e.g., Gulati and Higgins, 
                                                          
18
 For all four models, we report the standardized coefficients for the sub-models having all controls and 
regressors. 
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2006, find a positive correspondence between underwriter prestige and several measures 
of IPO success). However, contrary to our expectations, underwriter reputation does not 
significantly influence Tobin’s Q (β = .09, p>.10), most likely because of the features of 
Tobin’s Q we discussed earlier. Patent count, as expected, is strongly positively related to 
all four measures of performance (β = .13, p< .01, model 1; β = .20, p< .001, model 2; β = 
-.12, p< .05, model 3; β = .22, p< .01, model 4). This confirms Long’s (2002) conjecture 
that having patents reduces the future discount rates capital markets apply to value firms. 
We find mixed results for underpricing, our final DI signal. It creates long term firm 
value (β = -.13, p< .05 for liquidity; β = .16, p< .05 for Tobin’s Q), but reduces short-term 
proceeds raised (β = -.05, p< .10) and is positive but insignificant for market value, 
suggesting that while underpricing leads to greater breadth and diffusion of post-IPO 
trading (Booth and Chua, 1996), this demand may be generated with a lag. 
 
2.5.6. Findings for DC signals. 
On the other hand, DC signals expectedly have little explanatory power. In models 1 to 3 
(sub-models with all controls and regressors), both outside director and venture capital 
ownership have a negative but insignificant effect, and inside director ownership a 
positive but insignificant effect, on gross proceeds, market value and liquidity. The 
negative effect of outside director ownership is actually significant for market value (β = 
-.08, p< .05) and liquidity (β = .10, p< .05) in the sub-models with only the DC regressors 
added to controls. Our results suggest that inside director ownership does send positive 
vibes to investors, but these are not strong enough to convince investors of the insider’s 
incentives to monitor and thereby reduce agency costs, rather than exploit any 
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information advantages such insiders have. On the other hand, the market discounts 
signals of incentive alignment that ownership is supposed to confer on outside directors 
and venture capitalists, instead taking into account the information advantages of these 
large owners, and more so in the case of outside directors (cf. Schnatterly, Shaw and 
Jennings, 2008). These empirical findings confirm our theoretical predictions based on 
signal characteristics that DC signals have lesser credibility for investors both during and 
after an IPO.
19
 
 
2.5.7. Economic significance  
For a clearer interpretation of the substantive or economic importance of the effects of DI 
and DC signals on the four indicators of market performance, we consider the 
unstandardized coefficients. This avoids possible pitfalls in interpreting log-linear or log-
log models (like we have here) in conjunction with standardized estimates, and allows us 
to study the effect on the actual dependent variable rather than on its logged version.  
 
Starting with gross proceeds (logged), we find that for our log-linear model, a one unit 
change in underwriter reputation generates a 23 percent change in gross proceeds 
                                                          
19
  We also conducted some robustness checks. We used raw patent count (after removing outliers), patent 
citation (to account for skewness in patent value) and patent dummy to confirm our results based on logged 
patent count. We tested our results for liquidity based on 500 days and 750 days after the IPO. We used 
venture capital dummy instead of ownership. We substituted one digit industry sic codes with two digit sic 
codes. We followed Schnatterly et al., 2008, and split institutional ownership into ‘largest, and all other’ (to 
account for information advantages of the largest institutional owner). In all these cases, our results do not 
change.  
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(actual).
20
 Our median gross proceeds being US$ 90 million, this implies an increase of 
about US$ 20 million in median proceeds (US$ 40 million for the mean firm) for a one 
unit increase in underwriter reputation. However, this conclusion should be drawn with 
the caveat that underwriter reputation rankings in our sample are already very high (a 
mean of 8.07 and a median of 9 in our sample, on a scale of 0 to 9, and a standard 
deviation of just 1.49), not only suggesting that most firms are already aware of the gains 
from underwriter reputation, but also that future IPOs may not have a lot of leverage in 
increasing the already high levels of underwriter reputation to the maximum of 9.  
 
The gross proceeds – patents regression is a log-log model, suggesting that a 100 percent 
increase in the number of patents will cause a 9 percent increase in actual proceeds, 
which translates to about US$ 8 million for the median firm (US$ 17 million for the 
mean).
21
 In other words, firms need to double mean patent count to about 20 in order to 
earn this amount. Since the costs of developing ‘real’ patents may be higher, one policy 
implication for firms may be to develop ‘cheap’ patents that will act more as strategic 
tools rather than as effective barriers to imitation. However, besides the question of 
ethics, such a strategy may not be sustainable in the long-run if other firms follow the 
same strategy and / or investors become wiser in interpreting such fake signals. Coming 
to the other signals, we find that while underpricing has an almost equal but opposite 
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 In log-linear models (also called semi-log models), the slope coefficient (b) measures the relative change 
in Y for a given absolute change in X. Further multiplying the relative change in Y by 100 gives the 
percentage change or growth rate in Y for the absolute change in X (i.e. a one unit change in X is 
associated with a 100b% change in Y). Using simple calculus we can see that: 
 
b = d(lnY)/dX = (1/Y)(dY/dX) = (dY/Y)/dX = [(Yt – Yt-1)/(Yt-1)] /(Xt – Xt-1)  
 
21
 In log-log models, b is the elasticity of Y with respect to X, meaning that a 1% change in X is associated 
with a b% change in Y. 
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effect (a US$ 6 million loss for a unit increase in underpricing, and US$ 13 million for 
mean), the coefficient sizes for the DC signals are very small (in addition to being 
statistical insignificant), and are therefore likely to lack economic significance. 
 
For market value – underwriter reputation (a log-linear model), a one unit change in 
underwriter reputation generates a 23 percent change in market value, which is US$ 75 
million for the median year end market value of US$ 320 (and US$ 175 million for the 
mean firm value of US$ 760 million). For underpricing (also a log-linear model), there is 
an 11 percent (US$ 35 million) increase in median market value (US$ 83 million for 
mean), indicating a large effect size in spite of a lack of statistical significance. In case of 
the market-value – patents relation (a log-log model), a 100 percent increase in number of 
patents causes a US$ 50 million (median) increase in market value (US$ 120 million 
mean). Once again, the DC signals show very small effect sizes to be of any economic 
importance (in addition to them being statistically insignificant).  
 
The very low effect sizes for DC signals is also evident for stock liquidity (logged), while 
the effect sizes are very high for all three DI signals. Here a one unit change in reputation 
causes a 37 percent rise in liquidity by .007 for the median firm with liquidity of .02 (and 
by .02 for mean of .06), indicating high impact (when comparing with mean industry 
liquidity for S&P 1500 firms, which is around .01). Underpricing has a similar (35 
percent) impact on liquidity, while doubling patents (i.e. 100 percent increase) increases 
median liquidity by 17 percent (by about .003 for median and .01 for mean).  
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For Tobin’s Q, we find that it increases by 11 percent (or .20) for the median firm in our 
sample (given a median value of 1.86) for one unit increase in reputation (.27 for mean of 
2.46), and by 39 percent (or .73) for a unit increase in underpricing (.96 for mean). 
Considering that the median industry Tobin’s Q for S&P 1500 firms has been 1.21 (mean 
of 1.69) over the 1995 – 2009 period, at least the underpricing effect (about 60 percent of 
both industry median and mean) is very large. Therefore, the large, combined economic 
benefits of underpricing for market value, liquidity and Tobin’s Q appear to far outweigh 
the potential US$ 6 million median loss in gross proceeds we discussed earlier. Finally, a 
doubling of patent count causes a 25 percent increase of Tobin’s Q (i.e., by .47 for 
median and .62 for mean). Expectedly, the DC signals have very low effect sizes to have 
any economic significance. 
 
2.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
2.6.1. Review. 
IPO activity has been increasing rapidly in the recent past. Given that start-up firms often 
have short histories and little market reputation, and are in niche, often fast-moving 
industries (Long, 2002), it is imperative for both firm and investor to find genuine 
indicators of true business value. Signals can address the adverse selection problem at an 
IPO, and some management research has studied their impact on performance. This study 
proposes a typology of signals as DI and DC based on five fundamental characteristics on 
which these two classes of signals differ, and shows that DI signals act as more powerful 
predictors of firm value than DC signals. Our study is comprehensive as we bring 
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together six different types of signals into these two groups, and examine their influence 
on four different measures of market performance at different time periods. Market 
performance measures are more relevant to the study of signals than accounting measures 
as they directly capture investor sentiments and reactions to signals. Also, liquidity is a 
new measure that we introduce, given the many advantages of stock liquidity for the firm 
and the investor that we discussed earlier. 
 
Our results are comparable to earlier studies. For patents, our first DI signal, our findings 
that they consistently improve performance are in line with current understanding that 
patents boost investor estimates of firm value, increase venture capital financing, reduce 
underpricing etc. (Long, 2002; Heeley et al., 2007; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2007). 
Underpricing increases long-term value, consistent with Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), but 
contrary to Jain and Kini (1994), who do not find evidence of a relation between 
underpricing and long-term operating performance. Our strong and positive results for 
underwriter reputation mirror similar findings by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), Brau 
and Fawcett (2006), etc. Coming to the DC signals, the insignificant results for inside 
director ownership as well as the partially significant results (i.e. for some of the sub-
models) for outside director ownership are consistent with Arthurs et al. (2008), but 
different from Sanders and Boivie (2004) who find that executive stock ownership at IPO 
increases market value while outside director ownership does not. For venture capital 
ownership too, the insignificance of our results are in line with Arthurs et al., (2008), but 
differ from Jain and Kini (1995). The different dependent variables for performance used 
in various studies may be at least partially responsible for these differences in results.  
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2.6.2. Endogeneity. 
Our study is not without limitations, one of which is that we are unable to correct for 
endogeneity. Endogeneity in this context may arise from omitted variables bias. For 
example, a firm with high quality scientific talent may file for a larger number of patents 
as well as attract investor attention in the capital market (thereby increasing gross 
proceeds, market value etc.). In such cases, the positive association between patents and 
gross proceeds, or patents and market value, may be artificially inflated. Similarly, 
certain DI and DC signals may be inter-related. For example, since underpricing may 
lead to greater share retention (since pre-IPO owners lose more when selling an 
underpriced stock), it is possible that owners take simultaneous decisions on underpricing 
(a DI signal) and retained share ownership (a DC signal). This likely creates possible bias 
in our coefficient estimates. For example, the positive relation between underpricing and 
stock liquidity may be reduced if we consider that underpricing indirectly decreases 
liquidity by increasing share retention. Similarly, it is possible that the media attention 
that a firm got before its IPO (e.g., Google) enabled it to attract reputable underwriters as 
well as to generate significant investor interest. In such a case, the positive relation 
between underwriter reputation and gross proceeds, market value etc. may be largely 
driven by this initial media reaction.  
 
Another common source of endogeneity in the IPO setting is self-selection. Some 
previous studies (e.g. Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Walters et al., 2010) adopt the Heckman 
selection model where factors like geographical location, founding year and business type 
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that predict (via a first-stage Probit model) the likelihood of a firm going public, also 
influence post-IPO performance. However, we do not have access to data on the universe 
of firms that remained private during 2001 – 2004. While the Heckman two-step 
procedure is commonly used to address self-selection bias, the instrumental variables 
approach is equally applicable in such cases (Bascle, 2008). In all the above cases, the 
difficulty of application arose from that fact that we needed at least six different 
instruments (that meet the relevance and exogeneity criteria) for our six potentially 
endogenous regressors, namely the three DI and three DC signaling variables.  
 
2.6.3. Other limitations. 
Another limitation of this study is that some signals may not be strictly DI or strictly DC 
(e.g., underpricing can be a DC signal to the extent that its true cost depends on whether 
the firm performs well after IPO and is thus able to recoup the underpricing loss through 
an overpriced secondary issue). Plus there may be other signaling dimensions we have 
omitted. For example, Heil and Robertson (1991) mention signal aggressiveness and 
compatibility in the context of ‘competitive’ market signaling. This study also has certain 
other limitations in common with other signaling studies in management (e.g., Sanders 
and Boivie, 2004). For example, our assumption that investors are rational and have full 
knowledge of signaling pay-offs may be unrealistic. We also do not factor in 
postcontractual variables like managerial moral hazard or analyst following that may alter 
the impact of precontractual signals on post-IPO performance.  
 
2.6.4. Future directions. 
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There are several avenues of future research. First, research can examine the idea of 
complementarities among signals. These complementarities can be explored through 
interactions among one or more DI and DC signals, as well as by bringing in new DI 
signals (like advertising), new DC signals (like dividend policy or product warranties) or 
signals from external actors like the media and analysts. For example, some preliminary 
analyses we did suggest that the interaction of patents and underpricing has a much 
stronger effect in increasing liquidity than any of these signals alone, and research can 
further explore the efficacy of such signal combinations. On similar lines, past studies 
have examined issues like how patents lead to underpricing in IPO firms (Heeley et al., 
2007), how underwriter reputation reduces underpricing (Carter and Manaster, 1990), etc. 
Therefore, given that our six signals likely develop at and over different time periods, 
future research can explore if one or two basic signals used early in a firm’s life not only 
affect performance but also determine whether and to what extent other signals will be 
used. 
 
Additionally, here we characterize signals in terms of cost, clarity, consistency etc., while 
controlling for sender characteristics like firm size, age, performance, risk and 
governance structures. Future studies can explore other aspects of the complete signaling 
model (Heil and Robertson, 1991), such as how signaling effectiveness may vary by 
receiver characteristics (e.g., retail and institutional investors have different requirements 
and investment horizons), or how market and industry factors may influence signal 
interpretation (in addition to industry type and exchange listed on, which we control 
for).Also, our study has looked at the impact of signaling on capital market participants, 
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and future studies can examine how signals like patenting and partner reputation 
influence labor market participants like potential employees.
22
 Another fruitful area of 
inquiry is the idea of competitive market signaling, including how IPO signals elicit 
competitive reactions from rivals based on how they perceive the acting firm’s motives 
and intentions, and how strategic signaling can be used for collusion (e.g., Heil and 
Langvardt, 1994).  
 
Another line of research may be to extend both the size and years covered by our IPO 
sample, and see if the results are generalizable if examined longitudinally over, say, a ten 
year period. This is also important in order to reconcile the differences in some variable 
values we find when comparing with IPO studies that cover earlier periods like 1990 to 
1994 (Arthurs et al., 2008), or 1996 to 1997 (Certo et al., 2003). Another way forward is 
to see if external contingencies moderate the impact of DI and DC signals on firm 
performance. Higgins and Gulati (2003) partially address this issue by examining how 
hot and cold equity markets present investors with different types of uncertainty, making 
different interorganizational partnerships suitable for different markets. Future research 
may answer this question by constructing an index that measures the degree of 
environmental uncertainty (cf. Ndofor and Levitas, 2004), and then examining how signal 
relevance varies when market uncertainty is added to uncertainties about the firm.  
 
                                                          
22
 To our knowledge, the only management study that has looked at labor market reactions is Ndofor and 
Levitas, 2004, but their discussion is conceptual and does not empirically test the relevant constructs. 
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Finally, our typology of signals is one of other possible ways to group signals at an IPO. 
An early study by Bhattacharya (1980), for example, classifies signals into dissipative 
and nondissipative. While dissipative signals (e.g., excess underpricing or low-value 
patents) are inefficient relative to the first best, nondissipative signals (e.g., underwriter 
reputation) have no ‘deadweight loss’ attached to them (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). Also, 
future research can further classify DI signals into sale-independent and sale-contingent, 
and DC signals into revenue-risking and cost-risking (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). Sale-
independent DI signals are actions whose costs do not depend on how many shares the 
IPO firm sells at an IPO (e.g., underwriter reputation) while sale-contingent DI signals 
are those for which the expenditure takes place at the time the IPO shares are sold (e.g., 
underpricing). Conversely, all three of our DC signals are cost-risking for the pre-IPO 
owners but do not involve any direct revenue losses for the firm.  
 
In conclusion, our study provides evidence that the efficacy of signaling during an IPO 
depends on the characteristics of these signals. Signals that involve upfront expenditure 
and are also otherwise more costly, clear, consistent, committed and visible, carry more 
credibility with IPO investors. The resultant market buzz creates a self-sustained stream 
of demand that draws in new investors, improving firm performance and creating value 
for the firm in the medium and long run. Since signal power is determined by signal 
attributes that are costly to the firm, IPO firm owners therefore need to trade off such 
costs against the likely prospects of long-term value creation for the firm.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
 
MODELS OF IPO UNDERPRICING 
 
1. Asymmetric Information Approaches 
 
Theory Key References Key Contentions 
 
Empirical 
Evidence 
 
Adverse selection 
models (winner’s 
curse) 
Rock (1986); Beatty 
and Ritter (1986) 
Issuers underprice to avoid the 
‘lemons’ problem of adverse 
selection; some investors are 
perfectly informed while other 
investors, issuers and 
underwriters have little or no 
information about the real 
value of the firm 
Mostly 
positive 
Signaling models 
Ibbotson (1975); 
Allen and Faulhaber 
Issuers are perfectly informed 
while investors have little 
Mixed 
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(1989); Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989); 
Higgins and Gulati 
(2005) 
information about true firm 
value; issuers underprice to 
signal firm quality to investors 
so that they can subsequently 
issue seasoned equity at 
favorable prices 
Principal-agent 
models 
Baron (1982) 
Underwriters have superior 
information about potential 
demand for IPO shares; 
issuers therefore allow 
underwriters to underprice as a 
compensation for the use of 
their superior information 
Mixed 
Information 
revelation models 
Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) 
Underwriters entice informed 
investors to reveal their 
superior information, and 
compensate them for truthful 
reporting by underpricing the 
issue and giving them priority 
in allocation of shares 
Mostly 
positive 
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2. Institutional Approaches 
 
Theory Key References Key Contentions 
Empirical 
Evidence 
 
Legal liability 
models 
Tinic (1988); 
Hughes and Thakor 
(1992) 
Issuers underprice IPOs to 
avoid legal liabilities arising 
out of possible mis-statements 
in the prospectus 
Mixed 
Price support 
models 
Ruud (1991); 
Schultz and Zaman 
(1994) 
Underwriters do not actually 
underprice, but it appears as if 
they do; underwriters price 
IPOs at expected market 
values and support (via 
stabilizing bids and stabilizing 
trades) offerings whose price 
falls below the offer price in 
after-market trading, thereby 
censoring the left tail of the 
distribution of initial returns, 
and ensuring a positive 
Mostly 
positive 
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average price jump 
 
3. Ownership and Control Approaches 
Theory Key References Key Contentions 
 
Empirical 
Evidence 
 
Retention of 
control 
Booth and Chua 
(1996); Brennan and 
Franks (1997) 
IPO underpricing leads, via 
oversubscription and 
rationing, to a dispersed 
ownership structure which 
creates a free-rider problem; 
pre-IPO owners do not face 
external monitoring and 
continue to enjoy their private 
benefits of control 
Mostly 
positive 
Reduction of 
agency costs 
Stoughton and 
Zechner (1998); 
Filatotchev and 
Bishop (2002); 
Arthurs, Hoskisson, 
If pre-IPO owner-managers 
find that the agency costs from 
lack of external monitoring 
exceed the perceived benefits 
of control arising out of the 
Mostly 
positive 
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Busenitz and 
Johnson (2008) 
free-rider problem, they may 
allocate shares to large outside 
investors and / or reduce 
underpricing to ensure a less 
dispersed ownership structure 
 
Note: This table is adapted from Jenkinson and Ljunqvist (2001).
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APPENDIX B: Calculating the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure for two firms 
BAM Entertainment Inc., Ticker: BFUN 
Low Liquidity Firm 
Date of Issue: November 15, 2001 
Las Vegas Sands Corp., Ticker: LVS 
High Liquidity Firm 
Date of Issue: December 15, 2004 
 
Date 
 
 
Absolute 
Daily 
Return 
(1) 
Closing 
Price 
(2) 
Volume 
(3) 
Daily 
Dollar 
Volume 
(4) =  
{(2) * (3)} 
Liquidity 
{(1) / (4)} 
*(10
6
) 
 
     Date 
Absolute 
Daily 
Return 
(1) 
Closing 
Price 
(2) 
Volume 
(3) 
Daily Dollar 
Volume 
(4) =  
{(2) * (3)} 
Liquidity 
{(1) / (4)} 
*(10
6
) 
11/16/01 .0815155 8.00 1310858 10486864 .0077731 12/16/04 .054768 49.110001 7839900 385017494 .0001422 
11/19/01 .005 8.04 205950 1655838 .0030196 12/17/04 .0792099 53.00 4762500 252412500 .0003138 
11/20/01 .0012438 8.0299997 80585 647097.5 .0019221 12/20/04 .0830189 48.599998 6105900 296746731 .0002798 
11/21/01 .0373599 7.73 839587 6490007.5 .0057565 12/21/04 .0251028 47.380001 3210500 152113493 .000165 
… … … … … … … … … … … … 
11/07/02 .0140846 .72 120267 86592.24 .162654 12/06/05 .0094834 40.450001 871700 35260265.7 .000269 
11/08/02 .125 .63 59742 37637.46 3.32116 12/07/05 .011372 40.91 499600 20438635.9 .0005564 
11/11/02 .1587302 .53 31200 16536 9.599069 12/08/05 .0070888 41.200001 870400 35860480.7 .0001977 
11/12/02 .1509435 .61 90019 54911.59 2.748846 12/09/05 .0240292 40.209999 842700 33884966.2 .0007091 
            
 
Average for 250 Trading Days 
 
1.461082 
 
 
Average for 250 Trading Days 
 
    
.0005266 
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Note 1: The yearly average is based on all transactions for 250 trading days after the day of the IPO. Note 2: Data is obtained from CRSP. ‘Price’ denotes closing 
price; ‘absolute daily return’ is the absolute value of the daily holding period return. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Survival Analysis 
 
To determine if some of the variables in our analyses are associated with firm survival or 
failure times (which are dependent variables that are not normally distributed, and are 
also subject to censoring), we conduct survival / failure time analyses. We employ Cox’s 
proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) because of its advantages. It is a non-parametric 
approach that does not make any untenable distributional assumptions about the 
underlying survival distribution. The proportionality assumption also means that the 
hazard rate is an easy constant. Cox’s model is also widely used (e.g., in biostatistics). 
The basic idea is that  
hi(t) = h0(t)exp(β1xi1 + β1xi2 + …+ βkxik),  
or,             log [hi(t) / h0(t)] = β1xi1 + β1xi2 + …+ βkxik 
 
where h0(t) is a baseline hazard rate, xik is the value of the kth covariate for the ith 
participant, and, βk is a coefficient of the kth covariate that indicates the effect of the 
covariates on the actual hazard rate. If βk is equal to 0, the kth covariate does not have 
any effect on hazard rate, while a positive value of βk indicates that higher scores of the 
covariate are associated with higher mortality rates.  
 
First, we define IPO firm failure as bankruptcy leading to Chapter 11 filing and delisting 
from the primary exchange. There are 33 such firms. We calculate the time to bankruptcy 
in days starting the date of IPO issue. The non-bankrupt firms are right-censored as of 
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31st December, 2009. Since five years following an IPO has been suggested as the time 
frame during which a company may be considered a newly public firm (Fischer & 
Pollock, 2004), our end date of 31
st
 December, 2009, provides a strong test of survival 
even for firms with IPO issue dates in December, 2004. We construct a dichotomous 
outcome variable that equals 1 for a bankrupt firm, 0 otherwise. Second, we construct 
similar variables for the 119 firms that are delisted due to merger. 
 
For the sample of 417 firms (Chapter 1), we find that when all controls are thrown in, the 
illiquidity main effect for years two and three predicts bankruptcy (with statistically 
significant hazard ratios of 1.3 and 1.4 respectively). Year one illiquidity does not predict 
bankruptcy in the presence of all control variables (though the hazard ratio is 1.1, i.e. still 
greater than 1) but does so (with a hazard ratio of 1.3) when only the illiquidity main 
effect is considered. For merged firms, illiquidity actually reduces the chances of a 
merger (though the results are not statistically significant).  
 
In a separate analysis, we had also found that while both bankrupt and merged firms were 
delisted from their exchange, the merged firms had much higher liquidity than bankrupt 
firms throughout. Indeed, the average three-yearly liquidity levels of the 119 merged 
firms were only slightly lower than the 265 independent firms (0.11 compared to 0.07). 
We would have expected merged firms to have even higher liquidity than independent 
firms, since it is likely that firms that are subsequently acquired will have greater investor 
and analyst following to start with. That it is not the case leads us to surmise that merger 
activities are likely driven by factors (e.g., CEO hubris) that cannot be explained in terms 
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of capital market variables (like liquidity) alone. Overall, the results from survival 
analyses suggest that illiquidity predicts bankruptcy but is unable to have a statistically 
significant effect in reducing merger activity of IPO firms. 
 
For the sample of 312 firms (Chapter 2), our results from Cox’s proportional hazards 
model (considering only the main effects) indicates that among the DI variables, 
underwriter reputation reduces the risk of bankruptcy (hazard ratio is 0.71), while the 
other two DI signals (patents and underpricing) have no effects. Expectedly, the DC 
signals (venture capital ownership, inside director ownership, and outside director 
ownership) do not have any statistically significant effect in reducing the probability of 
bankruptcy. Considering the dependent variables in the main regressions as independent 
covariates in the Cox regressions (but without all the control variables thrown in), we 
find that higher gross proceeds and higher liquidity have statistically significant impact in 
reducing the risks of bankruptcy. We do not find any effect of Tobin’s Q on survival 
probability, while the impact of year-end market value in reducing bankruptcy is 
significant only at the ten percent level of significance.  
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Results of Cox Proportional Hazards Model for Bankrupt and Merged Firms (Chapter 1) 
 Bankrupt (33 firms) Merged (119 firms) 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
H.R. S.E. H.R. S.E. H.R. S.E. H.R. S.E. H.R. S.E. H.R. S.E. 
MAIN EFFECT  
Liquidity (log) 1.10 .13 1.28 .12* 1.41 .13*** .97 .07 .98 .06 .96 .06 
CONTROLS  
Firm size (log) .75 .09* .81 .10* .87 .11 1.00 .07 1.01 .07 .98 .08 
Firm age (log) 1.08 .22 1.01 .21 .89 .20 .85 .09 .85 .09 .82 .10 
Risk factors .97 .13 .96 .13 1.03 .14 .88 .06† .88 .06† .90 .07 
Firm performance (log) 1.00 .01 1.00 .01 1.00 .01 .99 .00 .99 .00 .99 .01* 
Founder .84 .38 .80 .36 .82 .38 .99 .22 1.03 .24 .98 .24 
Underwriter spread (log) .20 .13* .24 .15* .10 .09** 4.99 4.21† 4.13 3.44† 2.79 2.35 
Dilution 1.01 .03 1.02 .03 1.01 .03 1.02 .01 1.02 .01 1.01 .02 
Underwriter reputation .77 .09* .79 .09* .80 .09 .95 .07 .95 .07 .95 .07 
Non-contingent compensation  (log) 1.03 .08 1.03 .08 1.19 .19 1.11 .06† 1.12 .07† 1.13 .07† 
Contingent compensation (log) 1.06 .03† 1.05 .03 1.04 .03 1.00 .01 1.00 .01 1.00 .02 
Inside director start-up experience 1.03 .03 1.02 .03 1.01 .04 1.00 .02 1.00 .02 1.01 .02 
Inside directors on other boards 1.03 .10 1.04 .10 1.05 .10 .91 .06 .92 .06 .94 .06 
Inside director tenure .99 .06 1.00 .05 1.01 .06 .97 .03 .97 .03 .98 .03 
Inside director age .99 .03 .99 .03 .99 .03 1.01 .01 1.01 .01 1.02 .02 
Venture capital ownership 1.00 .01 1.00 .01 1.00 .01 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 
    All institutional owners 1.12 .87 1.41 1.08 1.64 1.27 1.47 .54 1.65 .62 1.80 .73 
Inside director ratio .74 1.08 .52 .79 .67 1.05 .29 .23 .31 .25 .52 .43 
Inside director equity .99 .01 1.00 .01 .99 .01 1.00 .00 1.00 .01 1.00 .01 
Outside director equity .99 .01 .99 .01 .99 .01 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 
 
    -2 log likelihood -166.65 -163.57 -151.03 -667.61 -637.51 -548.21 
     Chi-square 34.95* 40.94** 45.02 ** 32.56* 31.85* 29.75† 
 
Note 1: H.R. i.e. hazard ratios (or, exponentiated coefficients) are reported along with corresponding standard errors. A hazard ratio greater than one implies 
increased risks of bankruptcy, while a hazard ratio less than one implies a reduced risk. An alternative is to report the raw coefficients. However, while this 
alternate reporting affects how results are displayed, it does not influence the underlying estimation process. 
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Note 2: Results are displayed only for the liquidity main effect in chapter 1. The results for the main effects in chapter 2 are largely insignificant, and completely 
go away when control variables are also introduced. Hence they are not reported 
Note 3: Even for year 1, when only the main effect is considered, illiquidity significantly increases a firm’s hazard of bankruptcy 
Note 4:  *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10; n = 417 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 ANALYSES USING ARCHIVAL DATA 
 
 
To test some of the main effects for an extended time period, we collected data from Risk 
Metrics and Compustat databases for the ten-year period 1996 to 2005. We collected this 
data on 740 S&P 1500 firms that continuously appeared in the databases during this 
period. We collected data on a host of variables that are close in definition to our hand-
collected IPO sample. These included inside director ratio, inside director ownership, 
outside director ownership, firm size (defined as log of employees), net income, number 
of directors sitting on outside boards, director mean age, director mean tenure, and the 
sum of institutional holdings, ownership of largest institutional owner and all but the 
largest institutional owner. We also use dummy variables to control for industry using 
two-digit sic codes. Removing all duplicates, we have 5031 firm- year observations. 
 
Since our secondary sample, though large, does not exhaust the population, we run a 
random effects regression (however, our basic results do not change even if we run the 
fixed effects regression). The results uphold our hypotheses and in fact strengthen our 
current findings in the IPO context. As hypothesized in Hypotheses 3 in Chapter 1, we 
find that inside director ratio decreases stock liquidity (β = 1.11, p < 0.001), as do inside 
director ownership (β = 0.01, p < 0.001 and β = 0.03, p < 0.001 respectively). As in the 
main study, ownership by the largest institutional investor reduces stock liquidity due to 
informational advantages, while total institutional ownership increases it. Coming to 
chapter 2, wedo not have access to data on patents, underpricing or underwriter 
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reputation for these 740 firms. We also do not have data for gross proceeds for the IPO 
issue, a key dependent variable. We therefore regressed the other three dependent 
variables (market value, liquidity and Tobin’s Q) on the two available DC signals, 
namely inside director ownership and outside director ownership. We do not find any 
statistically significant results for Tobin’s Q, while market value is actually found to be 
reduced when using the DC signals (β = - 0.01, p < 0.01 and β = - 0.01, p < 0.05 
respectively for inside and outside director equity).  
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the archival data sample 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Liquidity (log) -6.52 1.92 1             
Market value (log) 21.86 1.55 -.90 1            
Tobin’s Q 1.61 1.51 -.29 .32 1           
Inside director ratio .33 .18 .20 -.13 .10 1          
Inside director equity (%) 3.86 12.13 .18 -.12 .04 .25 1         
Outside director equity (%) .67 3.16 .12 -.07 .01 -.01 .12 1        
Firm Size (log of employees) 9.25 1.40 -.60 .68 .01 -.07 -.06 -.05 1       
Firm Performance (net income) 483.82 1625.19 -.43 .51 .13 -.05 -.05 -.04 .36 1      
Directors on other boards 8.28 8.16 -.41 .44 -.04 -.26 -.02 .02 .41 .25 1     
Director age 59.82 3.47 .02 -.00 -.15 -.06 .08 .01 .03 .03 .06 1    
Director tenure 9.34 3.96 .19 -.15 .09 .41 .30 .11 -.08 -.04 -.22 .40 1   
Largest institutional owner (%) .09 .05 .15 -.13 -.09 .02 .03 .10 -.05 -.12 .02 -.01 .01 1  
All but largest institutional owner (%) .56 .19 -.29 .14 .08 -.19 -.14 -.10 .13 -.02 .14 -.01 -.13 .17 1 
 
Note 1: All correlations greater than or equal to |.10| are significant at p < .05 
Note 2: N = 5031;  years covered are 1996 – 2005 
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Random Effects Panel Data Regression Results 
 
Chapters 1 & 2 Chapter 2 
dep var 1: Liquidity (log) dep var 2: Market Value (log) dep var 3: Tobin’s Q 
Constant   3.62 ***   14.41 ***   6.52 *** 
MAIN EFFECTS(see Note 1)  
Inside director ratio  1.11***                        -.12† .61*** 
Inside director equity (%)                         .01***                         -.01**                          .00 
Outside director equity (%)                         .03***                         -.00*                          .00 
CONTROLS  
Firm Size (log of employees) -.84*** .66*** -.26*** 
Firm Performance (net income) -.00*** .00***                          .00*** 
Directors on other boards .01***                          .00                          .01* 
Director age                         -.02**                          .00 -.06*** 
Director tenure                          .01                          .01 .04*** 
Largest institutional owner (%) 1.65*** -1.02***  -1.39*** 
All but largest institutional owner (%) -3.01*** 1.32*** .76*** 
Wald Chi-square  2928.68*** 2762.58***      408.97*** 
R²                                                                                                                                                      58.13    68.0 24.6 
 
Note 1: For chapter 2, inside director ratio is a control variable, while inside director equity and outside director equity represent DC signals 
Note 2:  N = 5031; years covered are 1996 – 2005; *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10; two-digit dummy codes for industry are not reported here for 
brevity
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APPENDIX E 
C-INDEX & E-INDEX 
 
Additionally, we also checked to see if governance provisions based on the C-Index and 
the E-Index have implications for firm survival. Data was collected from the prospectus 
on the C-Index (a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a classified board, zero 
otherwise), and was available for 376 firms. We also collected data on the E-Index 
(entrenchment index), comprising in addition to staggered boards, limitations on 
amending bye-laws and charters, supermajority to approve merger, golden parachutes and 
poison pills. This time missing data brought down the sample to just 146 firms. We ran 
logistic regression models with unstandardized coefficients. Our analyses show that while 
having a classified board reduces the chances of failure (β = -.29, Odds Ratio = .75. p 
>.10, i.e. results are not statistically significant), it increases the chances of merger (β = 
.72, Odds Ratio = 2.07, p < .01) and concomitantly reduces the chances of remaining as 
an independent entity (β = -.60, Odds Ratio = .55, p < .05). This leads us to surmise that 
in the IPO context directors serving staggered terms are less inclined to extract benefits 
from their entrenched positions, and more likely to use their secure longer-term 
associations to increase firm value in a way that makes the firm a more attractive value 
proposition for potential suitors. For E-Index, however, the results no longer statistically 
significant (e.g., β = .25, Odds Ratio = 1.28. p >.10 for merger, β = .03, Odds Ratio = 
1.23, p >.10 for independent firms).  
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Results of Logistic Regression Analyses for C-Index and E-Index 
 C-Index E-Index 
Bankrupt Merged Independent Merged Independent 
Constant 2.88 -5.22† 1.36 -2.51 -1.80 
Controls      
Firm size -.29† .03 .07 -.09 .30† 
Firm age .46† -.22 .06 -.34 .21 
Risk factors -.01 -.20* .18* -.21 .26† 
Firm performance -.01 -.01† .01* -.03† .02 
Founder -.18 .02 .13 -.98 .90 
Underwriter spread -.86 1.30 -.56 .87 .48 
Dilution -.01 .00 -.01 -.01 -.00 
Underwriter reputation -.40** -.02 .16 -.28 .27 
Noncontingent compensation  .01 .12 -.08 .21 -.21 
Contingent compensation .09* -.01 -.01 .02 -.07* 
Inside director start-up experience .03 .02 -.03 -.02 .02 
Inside directors on other boards .07 -.10 .06 -.05 -.04 
Inside director tenure .02 -.02 .00 -.03 .05 
Inside director age -.02 .01 -.00 .03 -.02 
Venture capital ownership .00 .00 -.00 .00 .00 
All institutional investors .05 1.12* -1.00* -.48 -.06 
Inside director ratio .22 -.89 .06 -.37 -.40 
Inside director equity -.02 .00 .00 -.01 -.01 
Outside director equity -.01 .00 -.00 .01 -.00 
Main Effects      
Classified Board -.29 .73** -.60* na na 
Entrenchment Index na na na .25 .03 
Pseudo R²                                                                                                                                                      16.70 8.58 8.11 .14 .14 
Chi-square 30.71† 36.29* 38.05 ** 19.67 22.75 
 
Note 1: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10, n = 376 for C-Index and n=146 for E-Index 
Note 2: We do not report a ‘bankruptcies’ column for E-Index because the very low number of 
bankruptcies in the reduced sample of 146 does not allow a meaningful interpretation 
Note 3: Unstandardized coefficients are reported as the idea of one standard deviation increase for a 
dummy predictor (like classified board) lacks an intuitive interpretation; an alternative would be to report 
the odds ratios by running the ‘logistic’ command in Stata instead of the ‘logit’ command 
Note 4: ‘Bankrupt’, ‘merged’ and ‘independent’ are dichotomous variables measured as 1 or 0 
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APPENDIX F 
Future Directions (Chapter 2) 
 
We have used hierarchical linear regressions to test the effects of the three DI and three 
DC regressors on the four dependent variables of interest. Here we outline several 
supplementary analytical approaches that may strengthen both our methodology and our 
findings. However, the actual application of one or more of these analytical methods 
require some combination of the following: new sample construction, use of software like 
Latent GOLD or Mplus, substantial data management based on current sample, and new 
data analyses techniques. We therefore set aside such approaches as possible directions 
for the future. 
 
Step 1: Latent Class Analysis 
Latent class analysis (LCA) can help do a confirmatory study to affirm our theoretical 
predictions that underwriter reputation, underpricing and patents fall in the DI signals 
category while ownership by venture capitalists, inside directors and outside directors can 
be classified as DC signals. The idea is that the latent variables (here DI and DC) divide 
the population into mutually exclusive classes, and are measured using multiple observed 
or manifest variables (in this case, the three variables mentioned above for the two 
groups). While the manifest variables are usually categorical, LCA can also be extended 
to account for continuous variables. Once the model is fit to the data, it will give an 
estimate of the probability of these six items to be members of a particular latent class. 
Our sample is particularly amenable to LCA as we have a non-panel dataset over a 
limited four-year time span (this means that the latent variable structure likely does not 
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change during this time) and our sample size of 312 is above the usually acceptable cut-
off of 300 observations used for LCA model fitting (assuming the model does not have 
an identification problem, i.e. the number of parameter estimates is consistent with the 
sample size). While LCA can be implemented in Stata using the ‘gllamm’ command, the 
Latent GOLD and LEM statistical packages are more suitable for LCA.  
In sum, step 1 (LCA) is a confirmation that we have correctly classified the variables into 
DI and DC categories. 
 
Step 2a: Nested ANOVA 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests whether the means of ‘y’ vary across categories of 
‘x’ (and therefore tests whether both categories of ‘x’ belong to the same underlying 
distribution). While one-way ANOVA deals with only one categorical variable, namely 
‘x’, N-way ANOVA generalizes this approach to deal with two or more categorical 
variables. In our specific case, we aver that the nested ANOVA approach (e.g., McGahan 
& Porter, 1997) is more applicable. Nested ANOVA is an extension of one-way 
ANOVA. Here we have a single (hence nested one-way rather than two-way ANOVA is 
appropriate) higher-level nominal variable (that equals 1 if DI, and 0 if DC) divided into 
three sub-groups each (that may be either continuous or nominal, as in ANCOVA 
models), and these sub-groups are also distinct from one another, i.e. the data is not 
‘crossed’, as required for a nested model. Two different samples (one each for DI and 
DC) need to be constructed, and then data on the six sub-groups pulled together and 
stacked vertically in one table. The Stata command is: anova outcome group / group|sub-
group.           
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Some authors adopt a different (iterative) methodology to implement a nested ANOVA 
design. Here the idea is to partition the observed variance in the dependent variables 
(gross proceeds, market value, liquidity and Tobin’s Q) into components that are specific 
to the DI and DC effect classes. In other words, standard OLS assumptions are employed 
to check what percentage of variance is explained by each of the two effect-class models 
(that are dummy variables). Thus R
2
and adjusted-R
2
are computed for the two effect 
groups, and the F-statistic predicts the incremental explanatory power of the newly-
introduced effect. In the null model, both DI and DC effects are zero, and the intercept 
(grand mean) is the only explanatory variable. The residuals from this null model (that 
portion of the dependent variable that is not explained by the intercept) are used as the 
dependent variable in the next stage where the DI effect-class is introduced as regressor, 
and the F-test conducted. The residuals from this model will then be used to test the 
impact of the DC effect-class. The major drawback of this method though is that the 
results can be affected by the sequence of effect introduction; so the results need to be 
verified by introducing DC ahead of DI. 
 
Assuming our classification scheme was upheld in step 1, step 2a (nested ANOVA) is a 
way to partition the observed variance in the dependent variables between DI and DC 
components.  
 
Step 2b: Components of Variance (COV) 
Since the levels of the three DI and three DC effects we study here are likely to be sub-
sets of the larger population of these effects, a reasonable assumption to make is that DI 
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and DC effects are drawn via an independent, random draw from the underlying 
population of the class of effects (McGahan & Porter, 1997; Schmalensee, 1985). The 
main advantage of this approach is that it allows us to generalize beyond the specific 
results from our sample. On the flipside, COV does not allow us to test for the 
significance of the individual effects. Also, while ANOVA tests the significance of an 
effect while controlling for all previously introduced effects (via residuals), COV 
assumes that the effect classes as well as the residuals are totally uncorrelated to one 
another.  
 
Given its generalizability, Step 2b (COV) can be used to confirm the results in step 2a 
(nested ANOVA). However, nested ANOVA appears to be the better technique to use in 
case of a conflict in findings, as COV does not offer tests of significance, and also 
because nested ANOVA (unlike COV) additionally allows us to consider possible 
correlations between DI and DC signals (e.g., the relation between patents, underwriter 
reputation and underpricing).
23
 
                                                          
23
 Additionally, and for a more careful analysis (since we do not have information on the normality or 
otherwise of the underlying population distributions), we can conduct rank-based non-parametric tests like 
Kruskal-Wallis (comparable to the parametric one-way ANOVA). However, the actual data construction 
(e.g., conversion of measurement variables into ranks for both samples) for a nested model (as in our case) 
is likely to pose a significant challenge. Similarly, instead of conducting latent class analysis, the area under 
the non-parametric Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve can be used to evaluate the 
performance of classification models like logistic regressions and / or discriminant analysis (in terms of 
‘sensitivity’ and ‘one minus specificity’) when the target is binary (as in our case). Here too, the difficulty 
of application arises from knowing the exact variables that feed into the classification models in the first 
place. 
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Figure 1.1: Relationships among governance factors, IPO underpricing, and stock 
liquidity* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Solid lines represent existing relationships; Hashed lines represent theoretical/empirical 
advances studied in this paper.   
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Liquidity  -3.84 1.81 1                      
Underpricing 
(absolute) ($) 
2.27 9.17 -.31 1                     
Underpricing 
(relative) 
.26 .69 -.22 .70 1                    
Inside director 
ratio 
.27 .16 .05 .05 .04 1                   
Inside director 
equity (%) 
17.61 23.74 .11 .02 -.00 
 
.35 
 
1                  
Outside 
director equity 
(%) 
28.01 35.16 .07 -.06 -.04 
 
-.28 
 
 
-.21 
 
1                 
Firm Size (log) 6.29 1.94 -.48 .22 .19 -.05 -.14 .04 1                
Firm Age (log) 2.38 1.13 -.13 .09 .05 -.03 -.07 .05 
 
.48 
 
1               
Risk Factors 4.79 1.39 .06 -.07 -.06 -.00 .07 -.03 -.12 -.07 1              
Firm 
Performance 
(%) 
.87 21.56 -.36 .20 .13 
 
.15 
 
.05 -.05 
 
.35 
 
.21 -.12 1             
Founder .46 .50 .17 -.05 -.06 
 
.24 
 
.33 -.02 
 
-.28 
 
-.29 
 
.14 
 
-.12 1            
Underwriter 
Spread (log) 
1.89 .18 .22 -.04 .01 -.03 .08 .09 
 
-.32 
 
-.14 .11 -.07 .10 1           
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Note 1: All correlations greater than or equal to |.10| are significant at p < .05 
Note 2: While inside director, outside director and venture capital ownership figures are at the time of the IPO, institutional ownership figures are at the end of 
the year of the IPO 
Dilution ($) 9.78 7.57 -.38 .13 .07 -.01 .02 .18 
 
.35 
 
.19 .06 
 
.24 
 
-.07 
 
-.14 
 
1          
Underwriter 
Reputation 
7.96 1.52 -.45 .10 .03 
 
-.14 
 
-.23 .14 
 
.36 
 
.21 .02 .11 
 
-.14 
 
-.07 
 
.31 
 
1         
Noncontingent 
compensation 
(log) 
13.21 2.97 -.11 -.07 -.05 
 
-.14 
 
-.01 .14 
 
.15 
 
.16 .04 .03 -.01 .00 .11 .10 1        
Contingent 
compensation 
(log) 
8.63 6.88 .04 .00 -.02 -.12 -.07 .15 -.07 -.07 .12 -.12 .03 .04 .06 .09 
 
.20 
 
1       
Inside director 
start-up 
experience 
2.67 5.43 .12 -.04 .02 .10 .21 -.10 
 
-.24 
 
-.18 .07 -.06 
 
.22 
 
.02 -.10 
 
-.18 
 
-.07 .05 1      
Inside directors 
on other boards 
1.14 2.12 -.11 .05 .04 
 
.23 
 
.11 -.15 
 
.16 
 
.16 .00 .04 .00 -.10 .08 
 
.13 
 
-.07 -.09 .08 1     
Inside director  
tenure 
4.91 4.11 .04 .05 .04 .06 .22 .04 .07 .27 .04 .11 
 
.29 
 
.05 .07 -.01 .01 .04 -.03 -.01 1    
Inside director 
age 
49.53 7.74 -.09 .03 -.01 -.05 -.06 -.02 .11 
 
.18 
 
-.09 
 
.14 
 
 
-.19 
 
.00 .04 -.04 .01 -.06 .06 
 
.16 
 
 
.17 
 
1   
Venture capital 
ownership(%) 
35.92 35.68 -.02 .02 .05 
 
-.14 
 
 
-.22 
 
.08 .10 -.00 .03 .04 
 
-.15 
 
.01 .05 
 
.20 
 
.05 
 
.14 
 
-.09 -.06 -.05 .01 1  
All 
institutional 
investors (%) 
35.10 26.73 
 
-.23 
 
.09 .08 -.09 -.07 -.02 .07 .09 -.04 
 
.13 
 
-.03 -.02 .05 .10 .12 -.07 .02 .07 -.04 .10 .02 1 
Top 
institutional 
investors (%) 
8.16 9.77 -.03 .02 .05 
 
-.14 
 
-.09 
 
.18 
 
.06 .07 -.03 .06 -.07 .04 .10 
 
.13 
 
.06 .02 -.02 -.05 -.06 -.05 .07 
 
.60 
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Note 3: The raw means for the logged variables are as follows:  
Liquidity = 0.05; firm size (number of employees) = 3684; firm age = 19.62 (years); underwriter spread = 6.69 (percent); non-contingent compensation = 1.23 
(million dollars); contingent compensation = 2.36 (million dollars)
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Table 1.2:  Results of heteroscedasticity-corrected linear regression analyses for IPO 
underpricing 
 
Variable 
Absolute underpricing Relative underpricing 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls 
 
Constant 2.26           .99         .78 .74 
Firm size  .16 **   .16 **   .19 ** .19 ** 
Firm age -.01 -.01 -.09 -.09 
Risk factors -.07           -.07 .06 -.07 
Firm performance  .09 †  .08 † .03           .03 
Founder .03 .03 -.03 -.03 
Underwriter spread .06 .07 .08 †  .09 † 
Dilution .08 .09          .05          .06 
Underwriter reputation .03 .04         -.04 -.03 
Noncontingent compensation  -.10 † -.10 †         -.04 -.03 
Contingent compensation .06 .07 .00 .01 
Inside director start-up 
experience 
         -.02 -.03 .04 .04 
Inside directors on other boards .01 -.01 .02 .01 
Inside director tenure .03 .02 .08  .08 † 
Inside director age -.00 .00 -.07 -.07 
Venture capital ownership -.04 -.03 -.01 -.01 
Main Effects 
 
Inside director ratio             .01             .01 
Inside director equity             .03            -.02 
Outside director equity    -.08 *            -.06 
     
R²                                                                                                                                                      12.48 13.14 12.59 12.89 
Adjusted R²                                                                                                                                                      6.89 6.87 7.00 6.60
F      2.13 **     2.02 **       2.00 **       1.82 ** 
ΔR²            .66 †             .30 
 
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported; industry and year dummies are not reported for brevity 
*** p< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10, n = 417 
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Table 1.3: Results of heteroscedasticity-corrected linear regression analyses for 
stock liquidity 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls 
 
Constant -.43           -.32           -.29            -.08 
Firm size        -.33 ***           -.32 ***          -.30 ***            -.30 *** 
Firm age      .13 **            .13 **           .13 **             .12 ** 
Risk factors -.01            .01             -.01            -.00 
Firm performance    -.14 **           -.14 **          -.12 *            -.13 ** 
Founder         .02            .02           .02             .01 
Underwriter spread         .07            .05           .06             .06 
Dilution        -.20 ***           -.22 ***          -.21 ***            -.21 *** 
Underwriter reputation        -.31 ***           -.32 ***          -.31 ***            -.32 *** 
Noncontingent compensation          .01            .00          -.01            -.00 
Contingent compensation -.02           -.03          -.02            -.03 
Inside director start-up experience          .04            .04           .04             .05 
Inside directors on other boards         -.01           -.00          -.00             .00 
Inside director tenure          .02            .02           .02             .03 
Inside director age -.04           -.04          -.04             .05 
Venture capital ownership          .06            .06 †           .06             .06 † 
     
All institutional investors  -.09 *           -.09 *          -.08 *            -.08 * 
Main Effects 
 
Inside director ratio             .01           .01            .01 
Inside director equity             .02           .02            .02 
Outside director equity             .14 ***           .13 **            .13 ** 
Absolute underpricing            -.16 ***  
Relative underpricing               -.12 * 
     
R²                                                                                                                                                      50.98 52.59        54.78            53.94 
Adjusted R²                                                                                                                                                      47.71          49.04 51.27            50.36 
F        13.64 ***          13.01 ***         14.68 ***           12.60 *** 
ΔR²           1.61 **         2.19 ***            1.35 * 
 
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported; industry and year dummies are not reported for brevity 
*** p< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10, n = 417 
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Table 1.4: Results of heteroscedasticity-corrected linear regression analyses for 
stock liquidity 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls 
 
    
Constant          -.45          -.40           -.37            -.16 
Firm size      -.33 ***    -.33 ***      -.30***       -.31 *** 
Firm age           .13 **           .13 **            .13**      .12 ** 
Risk factors          -.00           .01           -.00             -.00 
Firm performance     -.14 **          -.14 **           -.12 *       -.13 ** 
Founder           .03           .02            .03              .02 
Underwriter spread           .06           .04            .05              .06 
Dilution      -.21 ***          -.23 ***      -.21 ***             -.22 *** 
Underwriter reputation      -.32 ***          -.32 ***      -.32 ***             -.33 *** 
Noncontingent compensation            .02           .01           -.00              .01 
Contingent compensation          -.03          -.04           -.03             -.04 
Inside director start-up experience           .03           .04            .04              .05 
Inside directors on other boards           .00           .01            .01              .01 
Inside director tenure           .03           .02            .03              .03 
Inside director age          -.02          -.02           -.02             -.03 
Venture capital ownership           .06           .06            .05              .06 
     
Largest institutional investor         .12 ***           .11 **      .10 ***       .11 ** 
All but largest institutional investor -.18 *** -.16 ***     -.15 ***         -.16 *** 
Main Effects 
 
    
Inside director ratio            .01            .02            .02 
Inside director equity            .01            .02            .01 
Outside director equity            .12 **            .10 **      .11 ** 
Absolute underpricing             -.15 ***  
Relative underpricing         -.12 ** 
 
R²                                                                                                                                                      53.36       54.38 56.45          55.68 
Adjusted R²                                                                                                                                                      50.12 50.83 52.94 52.11 
F        14.27 ***       13.57 ***         15.43 ***          13.39 *** 
ΔR²           1.02 *       2.07 ***      1.30 ** 
 
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported; industry and year dummies are not reported for brevity 
*** p< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10, n = 417 
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TABLE2.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Gross proceeds 
(log) 
4.58 1.00 1                         
Market value 
(log) 
19.72 1.12 
.79 
*** 
1                        
Liquidity (log) -3.69 1.86 
-.74 
*** 
-.78 
*** 
1                       
Tobin’s Q 2.46 1.81 -.10 .07 -.10 1                      
Number of patents 
(log) 
1.06 1.51 .07 
.17 
** 
-.01 
.28 
*** 
1                     
Underpricing .26 .71 .04 
.11
† 
-.22 
*** 
.10 
-.12 
* 
1                    
Underwriter 
reputation 
8.07 1.49 
.60 
*** 
.54 
*** 
-.48 
*** 
.02 .09 .01 1                   
Inside director 
equity (%) 
17.30 23.02 
-.17 
** 
-.11 
† 
.07 
.12
† 
 
-.06 .03 
-.26 
*** 
1               
   
Outside director 
equity (%) 
31.78 36.92 -.03 -.01 .05 .03 -.07 -.09 
.10
† 
-.23 
*** 
1                 
Venture capital 
ownership (%) 
38.33 36.15 .07 .05 -.04 .04 -.02 .07 
.18 
** 
-.21 
*** 
.08 1                
Firm size (log) 6.43 1.87 
.66 
*** 
.54 
*** 
-.51 
*** 
-.22 
*** 
-.14 
* 
.15
** 
.37 
*** 
-.11 
† 
-.02 
.10 
† 
1               
Firm age (log) 2.48 1.02 
.27 
*** 
.22 
*** 
-.14 
* 
-.20 
** 
.01 .02 
.17 
** 
-.11 
† 
-.00 .03 
.46 
*** 
1              
Risk factors 4.85 1.41 
-.13 
* 
-.12 
* 
.10
† 
.04 
.11 
† 
-.03 -.03 
.11
* 
-.04 .04 
-.17 
** 
-.15 
** 
1             
Firm performance 
(%) 
-.78 24.15 
.35 
*** 
.32 
*** 
-.38 
*** 
-.28 
*** 
-.16 
** 
.13 
* 
.13 
* 
.02 -.04 .06 
.44 
*** 
.29 
*** 
-.14 
* 
1            
Founder .47 .50 -.30 -.23 .21 .18 .05 -.05 -.17 
.39 
*** 
-.05 
-.15 
** 
-.27 
*** 
-.33 
*** 
.19 
*** 
-.16 
** 
1           
Dilution ($) 10.68 7.80 
.51 
*** 
.50 
*** 
-.50 
*** 
.06 -.00 .07 
.29 
*** 
.00 
.12
* 
.04 
.36 
*** 
.18 
** 
-.01 
.28 
*** 
-.10 
† 
1          
Noncontingent 
compensation 
(log) 
13.19 2.94 .07 
.23 
*** 
-.08 .06 
.10 
† 
-.07 .09 -.03 
.16 
** 
.07 
.14
* 
.09 -.00 .01 .03 
.10 
† 
1      
   
Contingent 
compensation 
(log) 
9.33 6.61 -.07 .04 .08 .09 
.17 
** 
-.03 .02 -.05 
.12
* 
.08 
-.14 
* 
-.13 
* 
.10 
† 
-.14 
* 
.07 -.02 
.19 
*** 
1     
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Note 1: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10; n = 312 (for Tobin’s Q, n = 269) 
Note 2: Our liquidity measure actually measures illiquidity, which is the inverse of liquidity 
Note 3: Market value is at the end of the year of the IPO; liquidity is for the 250 trading days (first year) starting the day after the IPO date; Tobin’s Q is at the 
end of the second year after the IPO year (e.g., 12/31/2003 for a 2001 IPO).
Inside director 
start-up experience 
2.42 4.89 
-.16 
*** 
-.16 
*** 
.15 
*** 
.04 -.04 .03 
-.18 
** 
.25 
*** 
-.11 
† 
 
-.08 
-.24 
*** 
-.18 
** 
.05 -.08 
.27 
*** 
-.13 
* 
-.10 
† 
 
.06 1    
   
Inside directors on 
other boards 
1.13 2.24 
.22 
*** 
.15 
** 
-.09 
† 
-.02 .00 .03 
.11
† 
.13 
* 
-.17 
** 
-.04 
.18 
** 
.16 
** 
-.01 .04 .01 .08 -.08 
-.10 
† 
 
.12 
* 
1   
   
Inside director  
tenure 
5.19 4.10 
-.10 
† 
-.04 .07 .01 .04 .03 -.06 
.24 
*** 
.03 
-.11 
† 
 
.03 
.23 
*** 
.03 
.12 
* 
.29 
*** 
.04 -.01 -.00 -.00 -.03 1  
   
Inside director age 48.89 8.00 
.17 
** 
.20 
*** 
-.09 -.07 .06 -.03 .03 
-.09 
† 
 
.04 .03 
.15 
** 
.24 
*** 
-.13 
* 
.13 
* 
-.20 
*** 
.09 .01 -.06 .01 
.16 
** 
.21 
*** 
1 
   
Inside director 
ratio 
.28 .16 -.02 -.05 .00 .00 -.07 .05 
-.14 
* 
.32 
*** 
-.31 
*** 
-.15 
** 
.00 .02 -.01 
.16 
** 
.23 
*** 
-.04 
-.15 
** 
-.13 
* 
.13 
* 
.28 
*** 
.06 -.05 1 
  
Exchange dummy .71 .45 
-.47 
*** 
-.34 
*** 
.32 
*** 
.19 
** 
.12 
* 
-.06 -.08 
.12 
* 
.14 
* 
-.09 
-.44 
*** 
-.23 
*** 
.08 
-.27 
*** 
.26 
*** 
-.21 
*** 
.11 
† 
 
.14 
* 
.12 
* 
-.12 
* 
.06 
-.20 
*** 
-.05 1 
 
All institutional 
investors (%) 
31.12 24.25 
.27 
*** 
.17 
** 
-.21 
*** 
-.04 .00 
.16 
** 
.22 
*** 
-.14 
* 
.09 
.12 
* 
.22 
*** 
.16 
** 
-.05 
.15 
** 
-.07 
.22 
*** 
.13 
* 
-.08 -.03 .06 -.01 .09 
-.11 
† 
 
-.04 1 
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TABLE2.2: Results of heteroscedasticity-corrected hierarchical linear regression analyses 
 
 Model 1: Gr Proceeds (log) Model 2: Market Value (log) Model 3: Liquidity (log) Model 4: Tobin’s Q 
Constant 
2.74 
*** 
1.54 
*** 
2.87 
*** 
1.63 
*** 
17.04 
*** 
15.71 
*** 
17.23 
*** 
15.80 
*** 
-1.30 1.15 -1.49† 1.06 3.63** 2.77* 3.45** 2.45† 
Firm size (log) .51*** .40*** .50*** .40*** .39*** .29*** .39*** .29*** -.41*** 
-.30 
*** 
-.41 
*** 
-.30*** 
 
-.15† -..20* -.15† -.18* 
Firm age (log) -.04 -.07 -.04 -.08 -.05 -.07 -.06 -.07 .15** .15** .15* .15** -.14* -.13† -.13* -.12† 
Risk factors -.00 -.03 -.00 -.03 -.00 -.02 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.01 -.02 -.00 -.08 -.08 -.08 -.09 
Firm performance (log) .08† .08* .09† .08* .17** .16** .17** .17*** -.14* -.14* -.14* -.14* -.22 -.21† -.23† -.22† 
Founder -.07† -.07† -.07 -.07† -.08 -.06 -.08 -.08† .08 .06 .08 .07 .00 -.02 .00 .02 
Dilution .30*** ,24*** .31*** .24*** .33*** .27*** .34*** .27*** -.34*** -.28*** -.35*** -.29*** .20* .16* .20* .16† 
Noncontingent comp. (log) -.01 -.01 .00 -.00 .10** .11** .11** .11** .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
Contingent comp. (log) .05 .01 .05 .02 .09† .05 .09 .06 -.02 .02 -.02 .01 -.04 -.06 -.04 -.06 
Inside director start-up exp. .01 .04 .01 .03 -.02 .01 -.03 -.01 .04 .02 .05 .04 .01 .00 .00 -.00 
Inside directors on other boards .09* .06 .09* .05 .05 .03 .05 .02 -.01 .02 .00 .04 .03 .02 .03 .02 
Inside director tenure -.09* -.06† -.08* -.07* -.06 -.05 -.06 -.06 .05 .04 .05 .05 .05 .03 .05 .02 
Inside director age .04 .04 .04 .04 .10* .11** .10* .11** -.01 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.03 
Inside director ratio -.01 .04 -.01 .02 .01 .04 -.02 .01 -.06 -.09* -.03 -.06 .03 .04 .03 .04 
Exchange dummy -.13* 
-.19 
*** 
-.13* 
-.19 
*** 
-.07 -.12** -.05 -.12** .04 .10* .03 .09† .02 -.02 .03 -.02 
All institutional investors     -.00 -.05 .00 -.04 -.05 .01 -.05 -.00 .02 -.01 .03 -.01 
Main Effects  
Number of patents  .14**  .13**  .21***  .20***  -.14**  -.12*  .20**  .22** 
Underpricing  -.05†  -.05†  .07  .07  -.13*  -.13*  .16*  .16* 
Underwriter reputation  .34***  ,36***  .30***  .32***  -.30***  -.31***  .09†  .09 
Inside director equity   -.05 .02   -.01 .06   -.00 -.06   .05 .07 
Outside director equity   -.05 -.04   -.08* -.05   .01* .08†   -.02 .03 
Venture capital ownership   -.03 -.06   -.04 -.06   -.00 .03   .05 .06 
R²                                                                                                                                                      63.21 74.31 63.59 74.77 55.64 66.49 56.34 67.32 49.16 58.70 50.07 59.60 21.14 26.73 21.54 27.28 
Adjusted R²                                                                                                                                                      60.27 71.96 60.26 72.18 51.92 63.29 52.18 63.82 44.90 54.78 45.32 55.28 13.39 18.52 12.75 18.12 
F  
18.98 
*** 
25.49 
*** 
17.56 
*** 
23.78 
*** 
12.19 
*** 
23.16 
*** 
11.03 
*** 
21.22 
*** 
10.52 
*** 
14.11 
*** 
9.78 
*** 
13.01 
*** 
3.87 
*** 
3.93 
*** 
3.37 
*** 
3.42 
*** 
ΔR²   11.10 *** .38 
11.56 
*** 
 
10.85 
*** 
.70 
11.68 
*** 
 
9.54 
*** 
.91 
10.44 
*** 
 
  5.59 
*** 
.40 
6.14 
** 
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Note: Standardized coefficients are reported; industry and year dummies are not reported for brevity; *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10; n = 312 for 
models 1, 2 and 3; n = 269 for model 4; R² changes are with respect to the basic model having only controls; Model 1does not have institutional ownership as a 
control variable as there are no institutional owners at the time of the IPO; Our liquidity measure actually measures illiquidity, which is the inverse of liquidity. 
 
112 
 
TABLE 2.3: Scores for signal characteristics at IPO 
 
                 Characteristic 
Default-independent signals Default-contingent signals 
P UP UR IE OE VO 
Cost (2 x 4 = 8)  
Upfront cash expended 2 0 2 1 1 1 
More costly for bad firms 2 2 2 1 1 0 
Opportunity costs 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Non-financial costs (e.g. social capital) 1 0 2 0 0 2 
Clarity (2 x 4 = 8)  
Unambiguous (known cause) 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Measurability 2 2 2 2 2 2 
No dual implications 0 2 2 0 0 0 
Low channel noise 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Consistency (2 x 1 = 2)  
Efficiency over time 1 2 2 0 0 0 
Commitment (2 x 2 = 4)  
Time / effort for development 2 1 2 0 0 1 
Future time / effort to be expended 2 1 2 0 0 0 
Visibility (2 x 1 = 2)  
Ability to attract investor attention 2 2 2 1 1 2 
Total score (maximum 24) 20 18 22 7 7 10 
Average score by type (DI vs. DC) 20 8 
 
Note 1: P = patents, UP = underpricing, UR = underwriter reputation, IO = inside director equity, OO = outside 
director equity, VO = venture capital ownership. 
Note 2: Scores for each sub-characteristic are based on a scale of 0 to 2, with 2 being given to a signal characteristic 
that makes the signal powerful and attractive to investors, and 0 being given to a characteristic that makes the signal 
weak and unattractive. Therefore, 2 = high, 1 = medium, 0 = low. We assign equal weightage to each sub-
characteristic. 
Note 3: Assigned values are based on assessments of signal strengths and weaknesses discussed in the theory / 
hypothesis section.  
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